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ZACHARY J. GUBLER∗ 
Abstract: When forming policy under conditions of extreme uncertainty, the op-
timal approach seems to be a process by which the policy decision is divided into 
multiple stages, or in other words, an experimental approach. The optimal legal 
vehicle for such policy experimentation is what this Article refers to as “experi-
mental rules,” which are rules that terminate automatically and are designed for 
the express purpose of generating data during the sunset period that can then be 
used to determine the optimal policy strategy for the long run. Yet it turns out 
that agencies rarely adopt such “experimental rules” in the real world. This Arti-
cle argues that the reason has to do with the political economy, which appears to 
disfavor experimental rules either because they are more temporary and therefore 
less valuable to interest groups or because they are more costly to adopt. To 
overcome these political economy constraints and encourage policy experimenta-
tion, this Article proposes having courts apply greater deference to experimental 
rules (at least during the initial, experimental phase of the multi-stage process). 
This approach would have the effect of nudging actors in the political economy 
toward experimental rules, thereby avoiding the possibility of sub-optimal poli-
cies becoming entrenched in permanent rules. It would also preserve rules that 
might otherwise be vacated by courts at least long enough to generate the neces-
sary learning to determine whether they should be implemented on a more per-
manent basis. 
INTRODUCTION 
The conventional wisdom is that Thomas Edison went through over a 
thousand different filaments before creating an incandescent light bulb that 
could stay illuminated for a substantial period of time without burning out.1 
Although perhaps an extreme example, this trial-and-error approach lies at the 
heart of the scientific process. Whether it is a pharmaceutical company devel-
oping a new drug candidate, a company deciding whether to introduce a new 
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product, or a venture capital firm structuring its investment in a startup compa-
ny, the process that yields the best results is one that consists of multi-stage 
decision making.2 The reason is obvious: data generated at an earlier stage can 
be used to inform decisions made at later stages in the process.3 
The benefits of experimentation could be realized in the governmental 
policy-making sphere as well, particularly in situations where the payoffs from 
a given policy are extremely uncertain.4 But in order to engage in policy exper-
imentation, we must overcome two obstacles that do not exist to the same de-
gree outside of the realm of government. The first obstacle is the path depend-
ency of law (the fact that law can be resistant to change).5 If laws are not easily 
reversed and modified, the experiment will be a failure no matter how effective 
it is at generating information regarding the optimal policy. There still exists a 
second obstacle, however, because even if laws are reversible, the experiment 
will still be a failure if lawmakers lack incentives to take into account the in-
formation generated by the experiment in formulating more permanent poli-
cies.6 In other words, the lawmaking process must have the capacity for “learn-
ing” in order for there to be effective policy experimentation.7 
Rules adopted by federal agencies that are subject to sunset provisions ar-
guably overcome both of these obstacles of policy experimentation.8 Such 
“multi-stage” rules overcome law’s natural path dependency, and therefore are 
reversible, because they automatically expire by virtue of the sunset provi-
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mate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1375–76, 1388 (2011). 
 8 A “sunset” provision is a clause included in a law that limits the duration of that law’s own 
validity. Gersen, supra note 4, at 247. 
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sion.9 Moreover, agency rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (“APA”) are subject to “arbitrary and capricious” review, which en-
sures that any information generated by the initial stage of the rule—prior to 
the sunset—will be taken into account during the second stage of the rule, 
where regulators must decide whether to extend the rule on a permanent basis, 
adopt a new rule in light of the experimental data, or revert to the status quo.10 
This Article refers to a multi-stage rule adopted for the purpose of experimen-
tation as an “experimental rule.” 
Given the potential benefits of policy experimentation, one might expect 
to find experimental rules to be pervasive at the agency level. Yet the opposite 
seems to be the case. A mere one percent of all of the final rules adopted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the past ten years fall into 
this experimental category.11 The rest not only lack an obvious experimental 
purpose, but also lack a sunset provision and therefore are not multi- but “sin-
gle-stage” rules.12 This is the case despite the fact that many, if not most, of the 
rules that the SEC promulgates have exactly the type of uncertain payoffs that 
would benefit the most from experimentation.13 Moreover, this phenomenon is 
not limited to the SEC, but instead appears to describe the pattern of rulemak-
ing at many, if not most, federal agencies.14 
This Article presents a theory to explain this surprising result and devel-
ops a proposal to encourage greater policy experimentation at the SEC and 
other federal agencies. The theory draws on public choice literature,15 which 
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(none), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (none). See infra notes 121, 129–130 and 
accompanying text. 
 15 See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, 
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (explaining the fundamentals of public choice theory and expand-
ing the theory to accommodate agency inaction); Peter H. Aranson, Theories of Economic Regulation: 
From Clarity to Confusion, 6 J.L. & POL. 247 (1990) (same); Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 629 (2008) (same); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, 
Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990) (same); 
Michael E. Levine, Why Weren’t the Airlines Reregulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269 (2006) (same); 
Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. 
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views regulation as the product of the political economy—in which regulators 
take regulatory actions (or refrain from threatened actions) to the benefit of 
small, well-organized interest groups who, in exchange, promise regulators 
lucrative industry jobs and other types of career support.16 Applying a public 
choice analysis suggests that experimental rules might be disfavored in the 
political economy either because they are valued less by interest groups or be-
cause they are relatively costly to adopt. 
Experimental rules may be valued less by interest groups because they are 
likely to be more temporary than permanent rules: the results of the experiment 
may undermine the rule and therefore prevent the rule’s readoption, or, if 
adopted, ensure that the rule is vacated on review after the rule sunsets.17 And 
even if the experimental data does not undermine the rule’s readoption after 
the sunset, the fact that the experimental rule automatically expires and there-
fore requires some agency action to make it permanent means that experi-
mental rules place agencies in a better position to extract rents18 from interest 
groups by threatening to let the rule expire on its own terms without rea-
doption.19 Thus, interest groups are likely willing to pay less for experimental 
rules than for permanent rules, and this willingness translates into less revenue 
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DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 359–70 (2003). This Article, however, adopts Professor Mi-
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tive appeal. See Levine, supra note 15, at 273. 
 17 See infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. Or, alternatively, interest groups may be suc-
cessful in persuading the agency to adopt the rule on a permanent basis, but the conflicting data will 
make it unlikely that that rule will survive arbitrary and capricious review by the courts. 
 18 The term “rents” in this context refers to “returns to the owner of an asset in excess of the level 
of returns necessary for him to continue using the asset in its current employment.” MCCHESNEY, 
supra note 15, at 10. One familiar example of rents is the producer surplus that the producer enjoys 
from being able to sell goods at a market price that is higher than the least that they are willing to sell 
for. This amount is represented in a supply-demand graph by the area between the equilibrium market 
price and the upward sloping supply curve. When regulators adopt regulation that favors one group of 
firms in an industry over another, it increases the costs of production and therefore shifts the supply 
curve up. In turn, that shift has the effect of increasing producer surplus, and therefore the rents avail-
able, for those firms that benefit from the regulation. These increased rents are considered bad rents 
since society is poorer for the lost exchanges of goods for which demanders were willing to pay the 
price of supply. Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 747, 749 n.12 (2013). Regulators can then extract some of the rents created by regulation by 
threatening deregulation (either through repeal of a permanent rule or the threat of a refusal to extend 
an experimental rule on a permanent basis). See MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 17. The firms that 
benefit from regulation will be willing to pay up to the value of the rents created by regulation in order 
to retain them. See id. 
 19 See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying text. 
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for regulators in the political economy because the number of interest groups 
that lobby a particular agency is fairly entrenched and static.20 
Furthermore, experimental rules might simply be a relatively costly way 
of enacting policy. To make a policy permanent through the use of an experi-
mental rule, interest groups must go through two notice-and-comment peri-
ods—first at the outset of the experiment and once again after the rule has au-
tomatically expired under the sunset provision.21 Consequently, the value that 
agencies can expect to receive in exchange for experimental rules in the politi-
cal economy is less than they should expect for permanent rules. 
Thus, this public choice analysis suggests why federal agencies seem to 
avoid adopting experimental rules despite their considerable social benefits. 
Nevertheless, this analysis also sheds light on how political economy elements 
may be harnessed to nudge regulators toward greater use of experimental rules. 
In particular, this Article argues that courts should take a more deferential ap-
proach when reviewing an experimental rule at any time prior to the rule’s sun-
set.22 This deferential review would ask only whether the agency, in promul-
gating the rule, took into account relevant factors, not whether the agency’s 
ultimate conclusions were reasonable.23 In other words, with respect to exper-
imental rules only, courts should limit themselves solely to the procedural 
component of arbitrary and capricious review while foregoing the more sub-
stantive component that that standard of review typically entails.24 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 639–40 (2003) (arguing that 
there are fewer interests involved in the production of corporate law in Delaware than there are in Wash-
ington, D.C. and that there is little chance of interests migrating to Delaware that are not already there). 
This stability of the interests that manage to capture an agency is implicit in the observation that interest 
groups are more likely to capture one, rather than multiple, agencies. See, e.g., KAREN M. HULT, AGEN-
CY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN 8 (1987) (analyzing the ability of agencies to weaken the 
entrenched influence of external interest groups through agency mergers); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The 
Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1677 (2006) (contending that an interest group will generally find it harder to cap-
ture several agencies than a single agency). Indeed, implicit in the notion of industry capture is the idea 
that there is a small, relatively stable group of interests to influence an agency. Where this is not true, capture 
is less likely. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1231, 1277–78 & n.256 (1996) (citing numerous sources in support of this proposition). 
 21 See infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 187–193 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text. “Arbitrary and capricious” review, also called 
“hard look review,” contains both a procedural element, under which courts must consider whether the 
agency considered relevant factors in promulgating a given a rule, and a substantive element, under 
which courts must determine whether, nevertheless, the agency committed “clear error.” See Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Pres. Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761, 763 (2008) (explaining that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. was “widely taken to ratify both procedural and substantive components of the 
hard look doctrine,” which had been developed by the D.C. Circuit). 
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Two benefits flow from this principle of deference for experimental 
rules.25 First, this principle of deference would encourage policy experimenta-
tion, thereby increasing the likelihood that agencies will ultimately achieve the 
optimal policy while diminishing the likelihood that sub-optimal policies will 
become entrenched as permanent.26 Under this principle of deference, an agen-
cy’s decision to adopt an experimental rule (which expires automatically at 
some later point of time) would have a much better chance of surviving judi-
cial review than the decision to adopt a permanent rule.27 Consequently, this 
principle of deference would make experimental rules relatively more attrac-
tive to interest groups in the political economy, thereby nudging agencies to-
ward greater policy experimentation.28 
The second benefit that would flow from this principle of deference is 
that it would diminish the likelihood that courts will vacate optimal policies 
enacted as experimental rules before they can generate sufficient data to evalu-
ate the merits of the policy.29 The policies most likely to benefit from experi-
mentation are those with uncertain payoffs—uncertain, because there is a lack 
of data for predicting the likely policy outcome. When courts review rules with 
such uncertain payoffs, and where the evidence points in two different direc-
tions, there is a greater probability of judicial error, including that a court 
might vacate a rule that is in fact optimal. The principle of deference would 
address this problem by requiring courts to defer to agencies when this uncer-
tainty is particularly high. 
To better illustrate these concepts, this Article uses the SEC’s proxy ac-
cess rule as a case study.30 Adopted by the SEC as a permanent rule in 2010, 
the proxy access rule was subsequently vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 25 To be sure, this is not the first article to propose a more deferential standard of review with 
respect to agency rules. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rule-
making Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1453–54 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects 
of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of 
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 28–29 (1991). These prior proposals, however, were intended not to 
spur experimentation but simply to avoid the “ossification” of agency rules by what is perceived as a 
standard of judicial review that is too stringent. See McGarity, supra, at 1451–54, 1462; Pierce, supra, 
at 8. By contrast, the position taken in this Article is that substantive hard look review is necessary to 
reinforce the learning created by experimentation, but only after the agency has had the opportunity to 
experiment. For that reason, substantive hard look review should be relaxed during the initial, experi-
mental stage of an experimental rule (i.e., before the sunset) and then rigorously applied after the 
experimental period has expired (i.e., after the sunset) when the agency must make a more permanent 
decision in light of the evidence generated by the experiment. See infra notes 194–196 and accompa-
nying text. 
 26 See infra notes 255–256 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 190–193 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 187–188 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294); infra notes 197–246 and accompanying text. 
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for the D.C. Circuit in 2011, in Business Roundtable v. SEC.31 The SEC’s 
proxy access rule would have given shareholders of public companies greater 
power to nominate members of the company’s board of directors on the theory 
that such shareholder empowerment is necessary to reduce agency costs in the 
corporation and improve firm governance.32 The proxy access rule was years 
in the making and held out the promise of substantial benefits, but also threat-
ened to create significant costs.33 Three conclusions can be drawn from this 
case study. First, proxy access was precisely the type of policy that could have 
benefited from experimentation because of its extremely uncertain payoffs, and 
therefore, that the SEC erred in adopting the policy as a permanent rule.34 Sec-
ond, even if the SEC had adopted the policy as an experimental rule, the exper-
iment would have been short-circuited by the D.C. Circuit’s opinion.35 Third, 
the principle of deference would likely have solved each of these problems, 
both by nudging the SEC toward experimentation and by giving the court a 
reason to allow the experiment to run its course.36 
This Article consists of three parts. Part I identifies the benefits of policy 
experimentation and argues that it is best conducted through multi-stage rules 
at the federal agency level.37 It then demonstrates that despite the theoretical 
benefits of policy experimentation, the practice is actually quite rare among 
federal agencies.38 Part II uses a political economy theory to explain this lack 
of experimentation based on the notion that the potential rents that interest 
groups can obtain from experimental rules (and the corresponding value that 
regulators can extract in exchange for such rents) are much less than for per-
manent rules.39 Finally, Part III develops a proposal for encouraging experi-
mental policy making, which consists of a principle of deference for experi-
mental rules.40 It goes on to demonstrate how this deferential principle for ex-
perimental rules would have altered the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business 
Roundtable that struck down the SEC’s proxy access rule.41 
I. EXPERIMENTAL RULES: DEFINITION AND COSTS AND BENEFITS 
This Part both analyzes the benefits to policy experimentation and contends 
that such experimentation is best carried out through multi-stage rules enacted by 
                                                                                                                           
 31 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668. 
 32 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147. 
 33 See id. at 1148–49. 
 34 See infra notes 101–111 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 266–268 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 42–118 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 119–140 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 141–180 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 181–269 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 197–246 and accompanying text. 
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federal agencies. Section A of this Part details the potential benefits of experi-
mental rules.42 Section B then addresses two potential obstacles to an experimental 
approach to lawmaking, going on to explain how experimental rules overcome 
these initial obstacles.43 Finally, Section C addresses the scarcity of experimental 
rules at federal agencies.44 
A. The Benefits of Experimentation 
When faced with the challenge of having to making a decision under con-
ditions of extreme uncertainty—for example, a CEO’s decision whether to in-
troduce a new product line,45 a venture capitalist’s decision whether to invest 
in a startup,46 or a scientist’s decision whether to develop a new drug candi-
date47—it is usually optimal to divide the decision-making process into multi-
ple stages and to design an experiment to be carried out during the earlier stag-
es of the process. 48 By doing so, any learning created during that experimental 
phase can be used to inform decisions made in later stages of the process.49 
The benefits of experimentation could be realized in the governmental 
policy-making sphere as well.50 Imagine a hypothetical State’s policy decision 
whether to increase the highway speed limit to eighty miles-per-hour or to 
keep it at the current speed of seventy-five miles-per-hour. There are costs and 
benefits associated with this policy proposal. On the one hand, the higher 
speed limit will allow for a shorter commuting time. On the other hand, the 
higher speed may increase the risk of accidents. Assume that evidence from a 
neighboring state shows that when the neighboring state increased its speed 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See infra notes 45–64 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 65–118 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 119–140 and accompanying text. 
 45 See, e.g., ROBERT G. COOPER, WINNING AT NEW PRODUCTS: CREATING VALUE THROUGH 
INNOVATION 316 (4th ed. 2011). 
 46 See 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTUR-
INGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 9.2 (1995). 
 47 See Richard Simon, Optimal Two-Stage Designs for Phase II Clinical Trials, 10 CONTROLLED 
CLINICAL TRIALS 1, 1 (1989). 
 48 See MANZI, supra note 4, at xvi–xvii; Gersen, supra note 4, at 267; Listokin, supra note 4, at 
483, 491; David Brooks, Op-Ed., Is Our Adults Learning?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at A27. Ac-
cording to Professor Gersen: 
If policy outcomes are entirely determined by the available information set, then a 
staged decision procedure is more likely to select the optimal policy than a single-stage 
enactment . . . . Put differently, when initial decisions are likely to be wrong, staged de-
cision procedures facilitate the correction of errors, and this is particularly likely to be 
the case in policy contexts dominated by uncertainty. 
Gersen, supra note 4, at 267. 
 49 In probability theory, this notion of staged decision making is captured in Bayes’s theorem, 
which is commonly interpreted as a theorem allowing for the updating of probabilities as new infor-
mation is acquired. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 121 (4th ed. 2000). 
 50 MANZI, supra note 4, at xi–xii, 209–11; Listokin supra note 4, at 491; Whitehead, supra note 4, 
at 1295. 
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limit to eighty miles-per-hour, the benefits clearly outweighed the costs. But it 
is questionable how applicable that evidence is to the State, which has narrow-
er and curvier roads than the neighboring state and more precipitation, and 
therefore, is at greater risk for accidents. The State could stick with the status 
quo or adopt the eighty miles-per-hour speed limit, either on a trial basis or a 
permanent one. In most cases, as long as the policy’s payoffs are uncertain but 
potentially high, the optimal approach will be an experimental one. In this 
case, the optimal approach is probably to adopt the higher speed limit, but on a 
trial basis, which preserves the State’s ability to revert to the old speed limit or 
to retain the new one, depending on the results of the experiment.51 
Now consider another illustration, this time a real-world example of a 
policy adopted by the SEC in 2010.52 This policy, called “proxy access,” was 
intended to give shareholders of public companies greater power to nominate 
members of the company’s board of directors.53 The only real power that state 
corporate law grants to shareholders is the power to elect board members.54 
This power is substantially reduced, however, by the costs that shareholders 
must incur in order to nominate their own selections for the board of directors, 
costs that derive from printing and circulating to the other shareholders a vot-
ing ballot known as a “proxy statement.”55 Consequently, the process heavily 
favors management’s—and not the shareholders’—nominees to the board.56 
Proxy access was intended to change this dynamic by requiring the company 
to include shareholder nominated directors in the company’s proxy materials, 
thus defraying the substantial costs associated with the nomination process that 
prevents shareholders from realizing their power to elect board members.57 
The potential for proxy access to create substantial benefits was matched 
only by the policy’s potential for generating equally significant costs. As for 
benefits, the policy had the potential for improving corporate governance by 
                                                                                                                           
 51 In fact, the state of Utah did precisely this when it adopted, on a three-year trial basis, an eighty 
miles-per-hour speed limit on two separate stretches of the interstate. See Lee Davidson, Utah’s 80 
MPH Zones to Be Permanent, More Test Zones May Come, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2012, 1:17 
PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/54927666-90/areas-higher-limits-mph.html.csp, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A6M6-EZG6. When the resulting data showed no increase in accidents or fatalities 
under the new speed limit, the state adopted the eighty miles-per-hour speed limit on a permanent 
basis for those two areas. Id. 
 52 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668. 
 53 Id. For background on proxy access by two scholars who question its relevance in light of other 
corporate governance developments, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy 
Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1353–62 (2011). 
 54 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 53, at 1347, 1364. 
 55 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 
43, 44–48 (2003) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Access]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688–91, 696 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder 
Franchise]. 
 56 See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 55, at 44–48; Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, 
supra note 55, at 688–91, 696. 
 57 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 53, at 1384. 
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minimizing the agency costs that result from placing control over corporate 
policy in the hands of someone other than the owners of the corporation (i.e., 
the shareholders).58 The fear is that corporate managers—who are essentially 
playing with other people’s money—might make decisions that could benefit 
them personally but at the expense of the firm.59 Thus, proxy access had the 
potential to reduce these agency costs (and therefore improve firm value) by 
empowering shareholders to nominate their own candidates to the board of 
directors, which is charged with hiring and firing management.60 
Still, the policy was not without its costs. Opponents argued that proxy 
access would be used primarily by those shareholders, such as unions and state 
pension funds, with “special interests” that deviated significantly from the in-
terests of the rest of the shareholder base and therefore would not necessarily 
increase firm value—and could actually make matters worse.61 
Both proponents and opponents of the rule made plausible arguments, yet 
there was very little evidence available to the SEC to shed light on the ultimate 
issue of whether the rule was cost-effective.62 In other words, like a CEO’s 
decision whether to introduce a new product or a state legislature’s decision 
whether to increase the speed limit, proxy access was a policy with a highly 
uncertain payoff structure. Accordingly, the optimal formulation of the policy 
was likely as a rule adopted on a trial basis with an automatic expiration estab-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 55, at 47; Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, 
supra note 55, at 679–80, 696. 
 59 The genesis of agency cost theory is typically identified with Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For the classic account of agency cost theory in the legal context, see general-
ly FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW (1991). For refinements and extensions of the theory, see generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 
(1972); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 301 (1983). 
 60 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 55, at 47; Bebchuk, Shareholder Fran-
chise, supra note 55, at 696. 
 61 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1735, 1751 (2006); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s 
Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 70–73 (2003); Martin Lipton & Wil-
liam Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 754–55 (2007). 
 62 For an overview of the evidence relied on by both opponents and proponents of proxy access, 
see infra notes 209–229 and accompanying text. The lack of unambiguous empirical support either for 
or against proxy access largely explains the extreme rhetorical positions surrounding the issue. For 
example, proponents argued that it would help “restore shareholder confidence.” Walter Calls for 
Action on Proxy Access, Disclosure, Other Governance Topics, CORP. L. DAILY (BNA) (Feb. 19, 
2009), http://news.bna.com.proxy.bc.edu/cldn/CLDNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=11615079&vname
=ccdbulallissues&fcn=2&wsn=501784000&fn=11615079&split=0 (attributing phrase to then-SEC 
Commissioner Elisse Walter). Opponents, however, characterized it as a policy with the “potential to 
wreak havoc with American business.” David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Senate Bill Adversely 
Affects the Landscape, N.Y. L.J., May 27, 2010, at 5. 
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lished by a sunset provision.63 As this Article discusses later, however, the SEC 
rejected this option in favor of a permanent rule, which was ultimately vacated 
by the D.C. Circuit.64 
B. Obstacles and Potential Solutions to an Experimental  
Approach to Lawmaking 
Although the benefits of experimentation for policy making are certainly 
theoretically compelling, there are two initial obstacles to experimentation in 
governmental policy that do not exist to the same degree in other fields. 
1. Two Initial Obstacles: Law’s Path Dependence and the Lack of Learning 
Reinforcement 
The first obstacle to policy experimentation is that a law may not be re-
versible, which of course would defeat the goal of the experiment. If the data 
generated from the experiment is going to be useful, then the hypothesis being 
tested must be either rejected or not. The experimental law, therefore, must be 
capable not only of being maintained but also of being displaced by an alterna-
tive, superior law. Laws, however, can be path dependent for several different 
reasons.65 First, laws can have network effects—laws may become entrenched 
because the more people that rely on them, the more valuable they become and 
the less likely they are to be displaced, even by a potentially superior law.66 A 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Both participants in the notice-and-comment rulemaking and outside commenters urged the 
SEC to adopt an experimental rule. See, e.g., Creating ‘a Bigger Mess?’ Battle Lines Are Drawn on 
the Proxy Access Rule, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Sept. 2, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2331, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7KD-EPTE [hereinafter Bigger 
Mess] (quoting Wharton accounting professor Wayne R. Guay as advocating a sunset provision); 
Larry Ribstein, The SEC vs. Shareholders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Aug. 30, 2010, 9:15 AM), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/30/the-sec-vs-shareholders/, archived at http://perma.cc/KA9Y-
2YHR (recommending that the SEC build a sunset provision into the proxy access rule, rather than 
adopt a permanent rule that would exhibit the SEC’s “massive hubris that it can settle [the proxy ac-
cess] issue once and for all”). Nevertheless, the SEC adopted the proxy access rule as a permanent 
rule without automatic expiration. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668, 56,687 & n.169 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294) (adopting a 
final rule and thereby rejecting proposals to structure the proxy access rule as an experimental rule). 
 64 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146–47; Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,668. 
 65 For an overview of path dependency in the law, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in 
the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 
602–08, 622–27 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 641, 643–62 (1996). 
 66 The paradigmatic example of a good that creates such network effects is the telephone, which 
is valuable only to the extent that more than one person owns one. See Michael Klausner, Corpora-
tions, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772–73 (1995). When people 
rely on a given law, similar network effects arise in the form of industry practices, interpretive con-
sensus, and a developed body of case law. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects 
and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 279–80 
(2003); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
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second source of path dependency stems from the settled expectations of par-
ties who rely on the law and make investments based on the law.67 These in-
vestment-backed expectations can only be overcome at a cost and therefore 
may deter legal innovation.68 Finally, laws might be path dependent simply 
because they require the consensus of a large number of people to repeal 
them.69 In the case of Congress, a majority in both houses is necessary.70 In the 
case of administrative agencies, the source of the law’s path dependence is not 
necessarily the agency’s internal approval requirements, which are much less 
onerous than those of Congress.71 Instead, at the agency level, the source of 
law’s path dependence is the APA,72 which imposes significant procedural re-
quirements on the agency’s ability to adopt a rule.73 Moreover, there may be 
political considerations that also deter agencies from repealing certain rules.74 
Although the path dependent nature of law is an important obstacle to an 
experimental approach to lawmaking, it is not the only, or even the most sig-
nificant, one. In order to reap the benefits of experimentation in the lawmaking 
sphere, not only must law be susceptible to change, but legislators and regula-
tors must be as well. In particular, there must be the capacity for learning. In 
other words, in order for the experimental approach to lawmaking to be effec-
tive, there must be some reason to believe that the lawmaker will take the data 
generated by the experimental rule into account in determining the optimal 
                                                                                                                           
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 481, 565 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and 
Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 110 (2001). 
 67 ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK 154, 161, 169 (2008); Michael Trebilcock & Mariana 
Prado, Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 341, 350–51, 370 (2009) (arguing that the success of institutional reform efforts may hinge on 
proponents’ ability to mitigate the switching costs generated in part by investment-backed expecta-
tions). When these investment-backed expectations become culturally embedded, path dependency is 
particularly strong. See William M. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1215, 1216, 1273 (2001). 
 68 Mark Roe argues that the rule in bankruptcy law barring bondholders from voting to approve 
certain types of recapitalizations, including those that would extend the maturity date or change the 
principle amount, is an example of such an investment-backed path dependency. See Roe, supra note 
65, at 660. 
 69 See id. at 651 (referring to this source of path dependency as the “strong-form” variety because 
of its particularly forceful effect). 
 70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 71 See 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:42 (3d ed. 2010). 
Agency action must be authorized by the majority of a relatively small group of people comprising a 
board, commission, or council. Id. 
 72 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012). 
 73 KOCH, supra note 71, at § 4:10. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing procedures for notice-
and-comment rulemaking); id. §§ 553, 556, 557 (providing procedures for formal rulemaking). 
 74 See Gubler, supra note 18, at 786–90 (observing that the threat of a loss of political slack re-
sulting from the repeal of portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an effort to jumpstart the initial pub-
lic offering market may cause the SEC to look for alternatives, like the private securities market, for 
providing access to the types of services typically delivered by the public securities market). 
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policy.75 If the lawmaker is able to ignore that data, the experiment will be of 
little value.76 
2. How Experimental Rules Overcome These Initial Obstacles to Policy 
Experimentation 
Experimental rules promulgated by a federal administrative agency have 
the potential of overcoming these obstacles to policy experimentation. Exper-
imental rules have two defining features. First, they automatically expire by 
virtue of a sunset provision, and therefore, are a type of “multi-stage” rule—
the first stage taking place prior to the sunset and the second stage taking place 
after the sunset.77 Second, an experimental rule is a particular type of multi-
stage rule because it is adopted for the express purpose of generating data prior 
to the sunset (the first, or experimental, stage of the rule) that regulators subse-
quently take into account in determining whether to adopt the rule, or some 
variation of it, on a permanent basis (the second stage of the rule).78 
Thus, experimental rules promulgated by a federal administrative agency 
have the potential to overcome both of the primary obstacles to policy experi-
mentation. First, experimental rules avoid the costs of repeal that are a primary 
source of law’s path dependency because they expire automatically by virtue 
of the sunset provision.79 Second, when experimental rules are promulgated by 
a federal administrative agency, judicial review of those agency rules helps to 
overcome the lack of learning reinforcement.80 
In the lawmaking context, judicial review serves as the mode for learning 
reinforcement because there is an absence of many of the factors that typically 
facilitate learning reinforcement in other areas. Outside of the lawmaking con-
text, learning reinforcement relies on a combination of market forces and regu-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Gersen, supra note 4, at 267 (noting that “[e]ven if the aggregate quantity and quality of 
information is superior in staged procedures, legislators could still be less likely to effectively utilize 
the better information. . . . [because] policy outcomes are the result of many noninformational fac-
tors”). 
 76 See id. 
 77 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 78 See supra notes 6, 49 and accompanying text. Other multi-stage, or temporary rules, may have 
other purposes. See Gersen, supra note 4, at 268 (arguing that temporary or multi-stage laws can cor-
rect cognitive biases and act as placeholders until more permanent laws are decided upon); Kysar, 
supra note 6, at 1034–35 (arguing that in the tax context, temporary laws are a way of avoiding “pay 
as you go” (“PAYGO”), which is intended to force Congress to finance expenditures with non-
borrowed funds, but exempts temporary laws). 
 79 See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. Note that sunset provisions have been used in 
American lawmaking since the earliest days of the Republic. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 168 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (referencing the Constitution’s expiration of mili-
tary appropriations every two years—the sunset period—and the resulting obligation on the legislature 
to deliberate and reauthorize funding); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 
1789), in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (advocating a 
sunset period of nineteen years for every constitution or law). 
 80 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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latory structures to ensure that decisionmakers “learn” from their experiments. 
For example, a business that introduces a new product will have to respond to 
feedback from the market regarding the desirability of that product in order to 
effectively compete in its industry.81 In the pharmaceutical industry, the Food 
and Drug Administration’s (FDA) review of an experimental drug trial ensures 
that any data generated during the trial will be reflected in a company’s final 
decision whether or not to bring the drug to market.82 Yet experimental laws 
are not necessarily subject to these same market or regulatory forces. To be 
sure, at the state level, there may be competition among alternative regula-
tors.83 Likewise, at the federal level there may be competition from states84 or 
international jurisdictions.85 Nevertheless, there is considerable debate over 
whether this competition leads to better laws.86 Moreover, no equivalent of the 
FDA ensures that data generated by experimental laws is taken into account in 
final decisions. And although media plays an important role in keeping Con-
gress in check, the public has little appetite for the type of in-depth, detail-
oriented reporting on policy debates that would be necessary to enforce learn-
ing through experimentation at the federal level.87 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 
121 (2004) (explaining how product market competition functions to constrain managers). 
 82 See What Is the Approval Process for a New Prescription Drug?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194949.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/T3
QV-N8F8 (last updated Jan. 5, 2010). 
 83 This view of competitive federalism has been used to explain a number of diverse phenomena. 
See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974) (corporate law); Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the Bot-
tom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335 (2001) (clean air policy); Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive 
Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 352 (2002) (welfare bene-
fits). 
 84 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 20, at 600 (arguing that in the market for corporate law, Delaware’s 
primary competition comes not from other states but from the U.S. Congress). 
 85 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the Interna-
tional Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922 (1998) (describing the competition 
among the United States and other nations to regulate securities); Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2419 (1998) (same). 
 86 For example, the debate over the effects of competitive federalism in corporate law has been 
raging for more than thirty years with little sign of abating. See generally, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–31 (1993); Bainbridge, supra note 61; Lucian Beb-
chuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 
(2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect 
Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, 
Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 (2003); Cary, supra note 83; Robert 
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Roberta Romano, 
Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251 (1977). 
 87 Some scholars have suggested mechanisms to address this lack of learning reinforcement at the 
congressional level. For example, Roberta Romano has proposed a procedural mechanism under 
which a panel of independent experts would propose a bill in light of available data generated by leg-
islation that is subject to a sunset provision. Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATO-
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Judicial review can serve as the necessary check (even if an imperfect 
one) for increasing the probability that learning generated from a multi-stage 
decision-making process will be incorporated into final policy decisions.88 Not 
just any standard of review, however, will be effective to this end. For exam-
ple, rational basis review, which requires that the law be supported by any con-
ceivable rational basis, would do little to ensure that the results of the experi-
ment influenced the ultimate legislative decision. It is for this reason that a 
federal statute is probably not the best vehicle for experimentation—even if it 
is subject to a sunset provision—because the rational basis review applied to 
federal statutes is unlikely to facilitate learning reinforcement. 
Judicial review of final agency rules, however, is a different story. This is 
because arbitrary and capricious review, also called “hard look review,” entails 
both a procedural and substantive requirement that is likely to reinforce the 
type of learning generated by experimentation.89 Specifically, in order to sur-
vive arbitrary and capricious review, an agency must demonstrate that it fol-
lowed a specified procedure, including that “it ha[s] responded to significant 
                                                                                                                           
RY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 99–100 (Cary Coglianese ed., 
2012). Under this structure, if the relevant congressional committee fails to take action prior to a pre-
determined timetable, the committee would be required to adopt the bill drafted by the panel of ex-
perts. Id. at 99. As Professor Romano notes, such a proposal is a modified version of a proposal origi-
nally suggested by then-Professor Stephen Breyer. Id. at 99 n.17; see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION 
AND ITS REFORM 365–68 (1982). 
 88 See Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource 
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 573 (2007) (“The courts, too, have a particular role to play in 
encouraging learning while doing. Judicial review can help counter the entrenched incentives agencies 
have to avoid learning.”). 
 89 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (ratifying the procedural and substantive aspects of hard look 
review); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (explaining that, in order to survive arbitrary and capricious 
review, the agency’s decision must be based on a consideration of the “relevant factors” (the proce-
dural element) and free of any “clear error of judgment” (the substantive element)). Note that most 
commentators agree that the Supreme Court ratified the procedural and substantive aspects of hard 
look review in State Farm. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1418 (2004) (“This so-called ‘hard look review’ developed mainly in the lower 
courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, but the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed it in 1983.”); Miles & 
Sunstein, supra note 24, at 763 (explaining that the State Farm decision was “widely taken to ratify 
both procedural and substantive components of the hard look doctrine”); Sydney A. Shapiro & Rich-
ard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of 
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE. L.J. 387, 423 (“The Court’s application of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review in State Farm gave it new substantive content.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 210 (“The State Farm decision expressly endorses the primary 
elements, both substantive and procedural, of the hard-look doctrine.”). But see Scott A. Keller, Depo-
liticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 424, 452–57 (2009) (con-
tending that the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. implicitly 
rejected the hard look doctrine and corresponding State Farm dicta, and subsequently, APA arbitrary 
and capricious review simply asks whether the agency reasons were “reasonable” (citing 556 U.S. 502 
(2009))). There is also a long debate over whether hard look review should in fact incorporate this 
substantive element. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Pro-
posals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 n.1 
(1997) (collecting sources). The origin of the substantive element of hard look review is typically 
traced to Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J. concurring). 
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points made during the public comment period, ha[s] examined all relevant 
factors, and ha[s] considered significant alternatives to the course of action 
ultimately chosen.”90 The substantive element of arbitrary and capricious re-
view, by contrast, requires the court itself to take a hard look at the agency’s 
decision.91 An agency “must articulate a ‘satisfactory’ explanation for its ac-
tions that does not ‘run counter to the evidence before the agency’ and that 
demonstrates a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”92 Under hard look review, therefore, agencies must justify their deci-
sion in technocratic terms, at a minimum taking into account all available data, 
basing all conclusions and predictions on sufficient evidence, and demonstrat-
ing that their conclusions are reasonable in light of this data.93 Thus, as long as 
an experimental rule generates useful data regarding the costs and the benefits 
of that rule, judicial review of final agency actions increases the probability 
that the final rule adopted by the agency will reflect this data, or in other 
words, that the agency will “learn” from the experiment. 
Some might question this argument that judicial review can reinforce 
learning on the ground that judicial outcomes are not necessarily determined 
by the merits of the case. Some scholars have argued that interest groups have 
just as much,94 if not more,95 influence over the litigation process as they do 
over the legislative and rulemaking processes. Small, organized interest groups 
that are able to win out over more diffuse and less well-organized groups in the 
political economy are likely to have a similar advantage in the litigation con-
text.96 They are likely to be willing and able to spend more on litigation and 
hire more skilled lawyers and therefore have a greater chance of prevailing 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 527 (1985). 
 91 See id. at 545–56; Sunstein, supra note 89, at 210. 
 92 Garland, supra note 90, at 545 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
 93 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The Court stated: 
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation 
for its action including a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.” In reviewing that explanation, we must “consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error 
of judgment.” Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that 
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 94 E.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 
101 YALE L.J. 31, 67, 80 (1991). 
 95 See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An 
Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1771, 1789 (2012) (arguing that the net 
effect of judicial review provides regulated industry with leverage that may actually undermine a 
federal agency’s ability to act in the public interest). 
 96 See Elhauge, supra note 94, at 77. 
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before a court.97 If this were indeed the case, there might be cause to second-
guess the assumption that judicial review will reinforce learning from policy 
experimentation.98 After all, if litigation outcomes are solely a function of the 
litigants’ comparative resource advantages, then it would be irrelevant how 
much data the court has regarding the costs and benefits of the rule under re-
view. 
It is extremely unlikely, however, that litigation outcomes are solely a 
function of comparative resource advantage. Surely, they must also depend on 
the merits of the case.99 The more the facts of the case favor one party at trial, 
the less influence a given level of resources will have on persuading the judge 
to rule in the other party’s favor.100 Where the evidence is more or less inde-
terminate, interest group resources will have the greatest influence on the liti-
gation process. They will have comparatively less influence when the evidence 
is more determinate. In other words, the resources of interest groups are going 
to be the least influential in evidence-rich environments, like those created by 
the experimental period (pre-sunset) of an experimental rule. 
The SEC’s ill-fated proxy access rule serves as an illustration of this 
point. In 2010, the SEC adopted the proxy access rule.101 Less than a month 
after the SEC adopted the proxy access rule, the Business Roundtable and the 
Chamber of Commerce, both corporate interest groups, challenged the rule in 
the D.C. Circuit.102 The court in Business Roundtable ultimately vacated the 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 There have been numerous studies, mostly within the political science literature, that suggest 
that litigation resources are a principal driver of judicial outcomes. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Melinda 
Gann Hall, “Haves” Versus “Have Nots” in State Supreme Courts: Allocating Docket Space and 
Wins in Power Asymmetric Cases, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 393, 409–11 (2001); Terence Dunworth & 
Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 515–17, 557–58 (1996); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who 
Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 235, 254–55 (1992). 
 99 And in fact, when viewed in the correct light, this is precisely what the empirical work on judi-
cial decision making tends to demonstrate. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in 
Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 688 (2009) (arguing that when the empirical 
literature on judicial decision making is viewed not in terms of whether extra-legal factors matter in 
judicial outcomes but the extent to which they matter, “the results of these studies are reversed, and 
instead of discrediting the judiciary, they confirm the legal integrity of the bulk of judging”); see also 
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4–6, 147 (2007) (concluding 
that, contrary to many economic theories, litigants do not appear to play a role in judicial outcomes). 
 100 This view is consistent with an economic view of judging, where extra-legal norms (like re-
sources) play more of a role in those cases where the judicial task is less fettered to authoritative texts 
and precedent, to be sure, but also to empirics. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 
Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 40 (2005) (explaining how extra-legal 
factors, including politics, have greater sway over the Supreme Court in constitutional cases, where it 
is less “tethered to authoritative texts, such as constitutional and statutory provisions, and to previous 
judicial decisions”). 
 101 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294). 
 102 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146. 
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rule on the basis that it was “arbitrary and capricious.”103 Interestingly, the de-
mise of the proxy access rule in Business Roundtable supports the interest 
group criticism of judicial review while at the same time illustrating why this 
criticism is not particularly forceful when applied to experimental rules. At the 
SEC, the proxy access rule was supported by institutional shareholders but ul-
timately may owe its adoption to the increased public scrutiny of corporate 
governance issues in the wake of the financial crisis,104 which resulted in Con-
gress instructing the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule in the Dodd-Frank 
Act.105 Yet these same political forces were probably less influential at the 
D.C. Circuit, given that Article III judges, with their lifetime appointments, are 
presumably insulated from such political vicissitudes.106 They are not insulat-
ed, however, from the influence of better financed litigants, which might ex-
plain why the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce ended up 
being more successful at the D.C. Circuit than they were at the SEC.107 To this 
point, the proxy access rule’s experience tracks the criticism that interest 
groups may have just as much influence, if not more, in the litigation process 
as they do in the legislation and rulemaking processes. 
Notably, however, the evidence upon which the SEC relied for its cost-
benefit analysis of the proxy access rule was decidedly indeterminate, even 
according to the court.108 Consequently, the Business Roundtable’s greater re-
sources were particularly influential, perhaps even outcome determinative. Yet 
imagine how this dynamic would have changed if, consistent with the recom-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. at 1156. 
 104 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (2011) (arguing that the political environment surrounding Dodd-Frank 
was typical of periods following economic bubbles, which often involve an upswing in populist anger 
alongside intense political pressure for action); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) (arguing that high sali-
ence events, like accounting fraud, can upend the traditional public choice balance, allowing policy 
entrepreneurs to get legislation passed that would not otherwise be possible in normal times). 
 105 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n) (expressly authorizing the SEC 
to adopt a proxy access rule and to set the terms and conditions of shareholder access). 
 106 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 235–37 (1985) (explaining various factors that assure the 
“competence” and “impartiality” of Article III judges). 
 107 There are many examples of interest groups that have sought judicial intervention after failing 
to gain traction in an agency’s rulemaking process. For example, in 2006, in American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the SEC’s argument that insurer AIG could, pursuant to the 
so-called “election exclusion” under the federal proxy rules, exclude from its proxy statement a share-
holder proposal proposed by the labor union AFSCME. See 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006). AF-
SCME’s proposal proposed that AIG itself adopt a proxy access rule in its corporate charter. See id. at 
123–24; see also Gubler, supra note 18, at 784–85 (detailing the AFSCME decision). 
 108 See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text. 
2014] Experimental Rules 147 
mendations of some participants in the SEC’s notice-and-comment process,109 
as well as several commentators,110 the SEC had decided to adopt an experi-
mental version of its proxy access rule. Imagine further that the experimental 
rule had produced evidence that was substantial and that resolved one of the 
major questions at issue with proxy access, thereby supporting the SEC’s con-
clusion that the proxy access rule was indeed cost-effective. For example, im-
agine that the experiment had generated data suggesting that the proxy access 
rule was often used by shareholders that broadly represented shareholder inter-
ests and rarely used by shareholders with special interests (like unions and 
state pension funds) that deviated from those of the shareholder base as a 
whole. If the Business Roundtable had then brought a lawsuit challenging the 
proxy access rule despite that type of evidence favoring the rule, it is less like-
ly that the Business Roundtable’s greater resources would have been the de-
termining factor in the case, as the court would have been constrained by the 
more determinative evidence. Consequently, hard look review would have re-
inforced the learning generated by the experiment. 
Thus, even if one is concerned about interest group influence on the judi-
ciary, this concern should be at its lowest ebb in an evidence rich environment, 
when the facts of the case weigh in favor of a particular outcome. This is the 
case with judicial review of a final agency rule following the expiration of the 
initial stage of an experimental rule. For these reasons, interest group concerns 
should not undermine the assumption that judicial review can reinforce learn-
ing in the case of policy experimentation by agencies. 
The foregoing analysis leads to two conclusions. First, as a laboratory of 
experimentation, Congress is probably not as effective as an administrative 
agency.111 Although Congress is perfectly capable of adopting experimental 
rules, there are no real mechanisms that ensure that later-stage decisions will 
reflect the data generated by the experiment.112 In other words, there is little or 
no learning reinforcement. There is, however, learning reinforcement with re-
spect to rules adopted by administrative agencies, thanks to hard look judicial 
review, which necessarily requires agencies to take into consideration relevant 
factors and demonstrate that the conclusions that flow from these considera-
tions are reasonable.113 Thus, the second conclusion to draw from the preced-
                                                                                                                           
 109 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,687 & n.169 (Sept. 
16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294) (identifying two different commentators—
Theragenics, a publicly traded company, and Alston & Bird, a law firm—who proposed adopting 
proxy access on a pilot basis). 
 110 Bigger Mess, supra note 63 (quoting Wharton accounting professor Wayne R. Guay as advo-
cating a sunset provision); Ribstein, supra note 63. 
 111 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 112 Although Congress may decide to adopt legislative rules (like the reconciliation process or 
PAYGO) in an effort to bind future action, these rules are “endogenous” and therefore can be modi-
fied by Congress at will when politically expedient. Kysar, supra note 6, at 1009. 
 113 See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
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ing discussion is that experimental rules will be most effective when adopted at 
the agency level. 
In Section C, this Article examines the use of experimental rules in the re-
al world.114 Before proceeding with that empirical discussion, however, there is 
one preliminary criticism of experimental rules that is worth considering at this 
time. The criticism contends that because experimental rules may only be tem-
porary (because they may not be readopted or replaced upon their automatic 
expiration), economic actors might behave differently under an experimental 
rule than they would under a single-stage rule—thereby compromising the ex-
periment.115 This criticism suggests that an experimental rule could lead pri-
vate parties to either over or underrespond to the experimental rule, which 
might skew the results of the experiment.116 For example, if a tax benefit were 
temporary, everyone might race to take advantage of the benefit during the pe-
riod it is in effect, and the resulting data that is generated by the experiment 
might be skewed by overresponsiveness on the part of the beneficiaries of that 
rule. On the other hand, if an experimental rule is particularly costly to imple-
ment, private parties might refuse to implement it on the belief that it will not 
be re-enacted anyway, leading to underresponsiveness.117 
Although these are no doubt legitimate concerns, they should not be fatal 
to attempts to encourage policy experimentation. First of all, there is no reason 
to believe that experiments will consistently be skewed in this manner. Private 
actors will overrespond to a policy only if they have the luxury of accelerating 
decisions and actions to take advantage of the temporary rule. Yet, some rules 
will limit the ability of individuals to suddenly alter their behavior in the hope 
of benefiting from the temporary rule. This was certainly the case with the 
SEC’s proxy access rule. The proxy access rule only applied to those investors 
who were not only aware of a mismanaged company, but who actually were 
owners of a certain amount (three percent) of stock of that company and had 
been for a specified time period (three years).118 Thus, unlike a temporary re-
prieve from the gift tax, for example, which would apply theoretically to every 
U.S. taxpayer and would be easily exploitable by the simple decision to give a 
gift now rather than later, an experimental proxy access rule would be limited 
to a relatively small class of people (investors in mismanaged companies) and 
even then would be very difficult to exploit on a short-term time frame (in light 
of the holding requirements). 
Similarly, private actors will not always underrespond to a policy. Under-
responsiveness by a private actor is likely to occur only if the value that the 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See infra notes 119–140 and accompanying text. 
 115 Gersen, supra note 4, at 277–78; Kysar, supra note 6, at 1045. 
 116 Gersen, supra note 4, at 278; Kysar, supra note 6, at 1045. 
 117 Gersen, supra note 4, at 278; see Kysar, supra note 6, at 1045. 
 118 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294). 
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actor obtains from the policy is dependent on the ability to take advantage of 
the policy in the future, or in cases where, in order to take advantage of the 
policy, an actor would need to make a significant upfront investment that could 
only be recovered by taking advantage of the policy in the future. Yet, once 
again, proxy access does not exhibit either of these two features, and accord-
ingly, an experimental proxy access rule is unlikely to be compromised by un-
derresponsiveness. 
Moreover, even if private actors do over- or underrespond to temporary 
rules, this altered behavior will not necessarily undermine the experiment. For 
example, with respect to the proxy access rule, overresponsiveness to the ex-
perimental rule might skew the results for purposes of determining whether, 
and to what extent, the rule will actually facilitate proxy contests. But it would 
not skew the results for the purpose of determining whether the rule would be 
used primarily by special interest shareholders—provided that there is no rea-
son to believe that one type of shareholder is more likely to overrespond to the 
rule than any other type, which seems like a reasonable assumption. Finally, 
even if private actors do over- or underrespond to temporary rules, and this 
altered behavior in fact does undermine the experiment, the agency will be 
aware of this possibility and will have to take this fact into account in its deci-
sion whether to extend the rule or not after its expiration. 
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the criticism leveled at temporary 
experimental rules should undermine the theoretical benefits that have been 
identified in association with such rules. The extent to which these theoretical 
benefits actually materialize in the real world depends on an empirical ques-
tion: how often do agencies actually use experimental rules? 
C. The Scarcity of Experimental Rules 
It turns out that despite their theoretical benefits, experimental rules are 
not particularly widespread.119 Consider, for example, the case of the SEC. 
During the decade-long period ending on December 31, 2011, the SEC prom-
                                                                                                                           
 119 One might point to the common use of sunset provisions in tax legislation as a counterexample 
to this claim that there is a dearth of multi-stage rules. See Kysar, supra note 6, at 1021 (noting that 
“legislators have employed sunset provisions with increasing frequency in the United States, particu-
larly in the tax-cutting context”). Sunset provisions, however, tend to be used in the tax context not for 
experimentation purposes but rather as a means of avoiding budgetary pressures on revenue-reducing 
legislation. See id. at 1018. A tax cut subject to a sunset provision will escape the PAYGO rules re-
quiring revenue offsets that would otherwise hamper a permanent tax cut, even if the temporary cut is 
likely to be extended after the sunset expires. See id. at 1017–19. The types of policies that will bene-
fit from experimentation are highly uncertain and therefore, by definition, are unlikely to be labeled 
revenue-reducing or revenue-increasing in the way that tax legislation can. Thus, PAYGO rules are 
unlikely to affect the types of policies this Article deals with. And in any case, PAYGO rules do not 
apply at all to administrative rules, which, for reasons previously discussed, are this Article’s main 
concern. See supra notes 8–10, 77–78 and accompanying text. 
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ulgated 302 final rules.120 Yet only three (or one percent) of those rules were 
structured as experimental rules, or in other words, as a multi-stage rule for the 
purpose of experimentation.121 All three of these rules dealt with policy issues 
                                                                                                                           
 120 This figure comes from the SEC’s website. See Regulatory Actions, SEC, http://www.sec.
gov/rules.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/AU28-UYWJ (follow “Final Rules”; then follow each 
year tab from 2001–2011 to establish number of final rules) (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
 121 This was determined by running the following LexisNexis search: “AGENCY(“Securities & 
Exchange Commission”) and (pilot or sunset) and ACTION (rule and not proposed and not interim) and 
date(geq (1/1/2002) and leq (1/1/2012)”. Before discussing the results of this search, however, it is help-
ful to explain why “interim temporary rules” were purposefully omitted from the determination of the 
number of experimental rules. An “interim temporary rule” is a rule that an agency can adopt immediate-
ly without going through the notice-and-comment rulemaking, if the agency determines that there is 
“good cause” to do so. 5 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B) (2012); Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making 
Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1999). Often, these interim rules look like experimental 
rules. They are structured as a multi-stage decision for the purpose of generating data that can be used to 
determine the optimal rule at the final stage of the decision-making process. The “good cause” exemption 
is quite narrow, however, and therefore agencies rarely adopt these types of rules. Indeed, according to 
the SEC website, between 2007 and 2011, only fifteen rules were structured as interim final rules exempt 
from notice-and-comment whereas 154 were structured as traditional final rules subject to all of the no-
tice-and-comment requirements. See Regulatory Actions, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml, archived 
at http://perma.cc/AU28-UYWJ (follow “Interim Final Temporary Rules”; then follow each year tab 
from 2007–2011 to establish number of interim temporary rules) (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). 
 With that caveat regarding interim rules out of the way, consider the results of the search. The 
search yielded thirty-four hits. Of these, only four were structured as multi-stage rules for the purpose 
of experimentation. See Delegation of Authority to the Director of [the SEC’s] Division of Enforce-
ment, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,820 (Aug. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200); Regulation SHO and Rule 
10a-1, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (July 3, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242); Short Sales, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240–42); Broker-Dealer Exemption From 
Sending Certain Financial Information to Customers, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,446 (Aug. 6, 2003) (codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Two of these four rules each pertained to the experiment regarding the uptick rule 
discussed further below. Thus, the search generated only three distinct examples of experimental 
rules. 
 Three other rules pertained to a 2007 interim final temporary rule. See Principal Trades with 
Certain Advisory Clients, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022 (Sep. 28, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (adopt-
ing a temporary rule in order to transition to an unexpected interpretation of the Investment Advisors 
Act by the D.C. Circuit in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). These 
three rules extended the sunset provision of that interim temporary rule. See Principal Trades with 
Certain Advisory Clients, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,236 (Dec. 30, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Princi-
pal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 75 Fed. Reg. 742 (Jan. 6, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
275); Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 74 Fed. Reg. 69,009 (Dec. 30, 2009) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). As explained above, the search was intended to omit these “good cause” exemp-
tions to the notice-and-comment process precisely because they are fairly narrow exceptions to the 
SEC’s general approach to rulemaking. Thus, this Article omitted them from the list of “experimental 
rules.” 
 Five of the remaining rules generated by the search were single-stage rules that commenters had 
requested to be structured as experimental rules. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668, 56,687 n.169; Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232, 11,278 
(Mar. 10, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456, 6,456 (Feb. 9, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 249b); Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,804 
(Apr. 16, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228–29, 240, 249, 274); Customer Margin Rules Relating 
to Security Futures, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,146, 53,147 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41, 242). 
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that were extremely uncertain. The first dealt with an internal issue regarding 
who should bring enforcement actions within the SEC.122 The second dealt 
with the regulation of short sales.123 And the third was concerned with the 
rules requiring broker-dealers to deliver information to their clients.124 
Still, these were hardly the only rules that the SEC promulgated during 
the first decade of the new millennium that could have benefited from experi-
mentation. In fact, participants in the notice-and-comment process recognized 
this fact on certain occasions.125 In five cases, a sufficient number of com-
menters had requested experimental rules such that the SEC had to explain in 
the final rule release why the Commission was instead adopting a single-stage 
rule.126 Moreover, this does not reflect calls made by outside commentators for 
the use of experimental rules for particular policies.127 
                                                                                                                           
 The remaining rules dealt with experimentations being run by entities other than the SEC, includ-
ing self-regulatory organizations (like the New York Stock Exchange) and industry participants, or 
were otherwise irrelevant. 
 122 Delegation of Authority to the Director of [the SEC’s] Division of Enforcement, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 49,820 (establishing a true experimental rule that was adopted with a one-year sunset—but interest-
ingly deals purely with the SEC’s internal procedure, in this case with respect to enforcement). 
 123 Amendments to Regulation SHO, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,706, 61,706 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 242) (addressing abusive “naked” short selling in all equity securities by requiring that 
participants of a clearing agency registered with the Commission deliver securities by settlement date, 
or, if the participants have not delivered shares by settlement date, immediately purchase or borrow 
securities to close out the fail to deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular trading 
hours on the settlement day following the day the participant incurred the fail to deliver position). The 
most significant example of experimentation at the SEC has been with respect to the uptick rule for 
short sales. In 2004, the SEC established a true experimental rule—what they called a pilot program—
with a one-year sunset that was intended to test the effectiveness of the uptick rule by eliminating its 
application to a subset of publicly traded companies. Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48,008; see also 
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, 72 Fed. Reg. at 36,349 & n.14 (providing background on this pilot 
program). After the conclusion of the experimental period, the SEC decided to eliminate the rule on a 
permanent basis. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, 72 Fed. Reg. at 36,349. When the financial crisis 
hit, the SEC came under attack from a number of different camps for having contributed to market 
volatility by eliminating the uptick rule. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. at 11,233. 
Consequently, the SEC reinstated the uptick rule, this time adding a circuit breaker, which in effect 
means that the uptick rule does not apply unless the stock price has dropped more than ten percent in 
one day. Id. at 11,232. Interestingly, there were requests for an experimental rule with respect to the 
circuit breaker, but the SEC rejected this request. Id. at 11,278. 
 124 Broker-Dealer Exemption from Sending Certain Financial Information to Customers, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,446. The Broker-Dealer exemption adopted amendments to a rule under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 that required a broker-dealer to send detailed balance sheets to customers twice 
a year. Id. The SEC rule provided a conditional exemption that permitted a broker-dealer to send only 
summary information as long as it also provided customers with other avenues to receive detailed 
balance sheet information. Id. The amendment aimed to reduce the cost of doing business for a bro-
ker-dealer while at the same time providing customers of the broker-dealer with easy access to the 
essential information they would need to evaluate the financial soundness of the broker-dealer. See id. 
 125 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 126 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,687 & n.169 (identify-
ing two different commentators—Theragenics, a publicly traded company, and Alston & Bird, a law 
firm—who proposed adopting proxy access on a pilot basis); Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 11,232, 11,278 (adopting a short sale-related circuit breaker that, if triggered, would 
impose a restriction on the prices at which securities may be sold short); Amendments to Rules for 
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The fact that the SEC promulgated so few experimental rules is surpris-
ing. What is even more surprising, however, is the number of policies with 
uncertain payoffs—that could have benefited from experimentation—that the 
SEC instead adopted on a permanent basis without experimentation. 
Nor does this scarcity of experimental rules seem to be limited to the 
SEC. For example, during the same decade-long period ending on December 
31, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission promulgated 259 rules, 
yet only two of these (0.8%) were structured as experimental rules. The results 
are similar at the Federal Trade Commission (0.8%),128 the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (none)129 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(none).130 
Indeed, this scarcity of experimental rules is what one might expect based on 
the dominant descriptive (and normative) model of regulatory design. This model, 
often referred to as “minimalism,” favors static efficiency—maximizing efficiency 
in the present without regard for future periods.131 This minimalism model, there-
fore, tends to ignore the learning benefits that arise from multi-stage decision mak-
ing.132 
To be sure, this is not to say that agencies never engage in experimenta-
tion. In fact, some regulatory regimes are designed specifically to take ad-
vantage of the learning benefits associated with multi-stage decision mak-
                                                                                                                           
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,462 (identifying several 
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations that had requested that one aspect of the proposed 
rule be adopted on a pilot basis); Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,788, 18,795 & n.86, 18,804 (proposing an exemption from certain requirements for audit 
committees for boards of auditors or statutory auditors of foreign private issuers that fulfilled the re-
maining requirements of the rule; provided that those boards operate under legal or listing provisions 
intended to provide oversight of outside auditors that is independent of management, that membership 
on the board excludes executive officers of the issuer, and that certain other requirements were met); 
Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,146, 53,147 (establishing a 
joint rule with the CFTC, in which the SEC rejected requests to experiment with the margin rules 
through an experimental rule). 
 127 See Bigger Mess, supra note 63 (quoting Wharton accounting professor Wayne R. Guay as 
advocating a sunset provision); Ribstein, supra note 63. 
 128 The one experimental rule generated by the search is Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,247, 13,248, 13,255 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312). During this 
same time frame, the FTC promulgated 122 final rules. 
 129 During this period, there were no experimental rules promulgated by the NTSB. 
 130 During this period, there were no experimental rules promulgated by the FERC, although there 
were final rules that were adopted on a permanent basis following the termination of an earlier exper-
imental rule. See Promotion of a More Efficient Capacity Release Market, 73 Fed. Reg. 37,058, 
37,059 (June 30, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284). There is also one example of the FERC reject-
ing commenters’ requests to structure a policy as an experimental rule. See Frequency Regulation 
Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,260, 67,272 (Oct. 31, 
2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 131 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 4, at 56. 
 132 See id. at 60–61 (“In practice, the minimalists seem to deploy a static conception of efficiency 
that risks slighting [the capacity for learning and innovation].”). 
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ing.133 These regimes include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which 
monitors data generated by nuclear power plants to constantly inform the 
agency’s understanding of potential hazards.134 Similarly, federal and state 
food regulators are able to assess and update their strategies in light of a con-
stant stream of data on food-borne illnesses, which is generated by a network 
coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.135 Additional-
ly, the Clean Water Act requires states to adopt and revise water quality stand-
ards at least once every three years to take into account the latest learning on 
the matter.136 More generally, experimentation seems to be embedded in cer-
tain regulatory cultures, particularly those that appear to be more closely relat-
ed to science, as is the case with the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).137 
Nevertheless, many other agencies, including the SEC, obviously fall into 
the minimalist paradigm, in which the benefits of multi-stage decision making 
are forgone in favor of a static, single-stage decision regarding the optimal pol-
icy—a decision often made under uncertain conditions.138 Though, as already 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. at 55–56. 
 134 See id. at 84–85. 
 135 See id. at 85–86. 
 136 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006). 
 137 The same search conducted for these two agencies yields many more cases of experimental 
rulemaking; 78 out of 1813 final rules promulgated by the FCC and 513 out of more than 3000 final 
rules promulgated by the EPA. Note, however, that these results were not individually analyzed to 
determine whether the rules should be classified as “experimental rules” for the purposes of this Arti-
cle; therefore, these numbers should be viewed as upper-bounds only. 
 138 See supra notes 119–132 and accompanying text. One might plausibly argue that the reason 
that we do not see much experimentation at the federal level is because of federalism concerns. Under 
notions of federalism, it was believed that the states were the actors intended to engage in experimen-
tation, not necessarily the federal government. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Rules are tested at the state level, incubated at 
the state level, and then adopted at the federal level only if they are successful. So, maybe the failure 
to identify experimentation at the federal level does not mean that there is a lack of experimentation in 
government but rather that what experimentation does exist is instead focused at the state level, where 
it belongs, and that federal rules are permanent because they reflect these rules that have already been 
subject to experimentation by the states. A moment’s reflection, however, reveals several problems 
with this argument. 
 First, although states can and do act as laboratories of experimentation, legal fields that have been 
preempted by the federal government simply cannot be tested at the state level. See Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that federal law “may touch a field in which the 
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of 
state laws on the same subject”). And even if there is not complete preemption, as in the case of state 
and federal securities laws, states cannot experiment with the federal overlay. See id. at 230–31 (estab-
lishing that federal law may choose to selectively preempt in such a way that allows states to continue 
to regulate, as long as such state regulation does not “collide” with the federal regulations). So, for 
example, a state could not decide to create a new exemption from the federal securities laws for com-
panies that are residents of that state. Preemption therefore hinders the ability of states to experiment. 
 Second, there might be pathologies in the market for law that prevents states from engaging in 
experimentation. For example, in corporate law, there is a debate as to whether the competition among 
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demonstrated, in the face of such uncertainty, a single-stage decision-making 
process is unlikely to be the optimal strategy.139 But this raises an important 
question: if experimental rules are so potentially valuable, why don’t agencies, 
like the SEC, make greater use of them? As Part II argues, the likely reason is 
that experimental rules are disfavored in the political economy.140 
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPERIMENTAL RULES 
Part II looks to public choice theory to help explain the dearth of experi-
mental rulemaking at many federal agencies.141 Section A of this Part discusses 
public choice theory generally.142 Section B then establishes how an under-
standing of public choice theory helps to explain why experimental rules are 
disfavored in the political economy.143 Finally, Section C uses a model to further 
illuminate why experimental rules are disfavored in the political economy.144 
A. The Theory: A Public Choice Understanding of the  
“Political Economy” for Regulation 
Public choice theory views the production of regulation through an eco-
nomic lens.145 According to the theory, regulation is a product that is ex-
changed in a market in which government is the supplier and certain firms 
within the regulated industry are the consumers.146 The key to this “political 
                                                                                                                           
states for franchise fees associated with incorporations creates a race to the top or a race to the bottom. 
See supra note 86 and accompanying text. If the market encourages a race to the bottom because man-
agerial interests have more influence over state corporate law than do shareholder interests, then states 
are unlikely to experiment with laws that favor shareholders at the expense of management. 
 Finally, even if the states manage to engage in experimentation, there may be benefits to experi-
menting at the federal level where there is less possibility of selection bias. For example, if a state (say 
New Jersey) were to pass a mandatory proxy access rule like the one vacated by the D.C. Circuit in 
Business Roundtable, interpretation of the data from that experiment would be complicated by the fact 
that companies can choose whether or not to incorporate in a given state. Thus, firms that choose to 
incorporate in New Jersey might do so because their corporate governance structure of shareholder 
base makes the proxy access rule either more or less valuable. 
 139 See supra notes 3–4, 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 158–165 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 142–180 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 145–157 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 158–165 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 166–180 and accompanying text. 
 145 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 146 MUELLER, supra note 16, at 1. According to Mueller: 
Public choice can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or 
simply the application of economics to political science. The subject matter of public 
choice is the same as that of political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voter 
behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public choice 
is that of economics, however. 
Id. 
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economy” model is the insight that regulation can actually benefit at least cer-
tain regulated firms by raising their rivals’ costs by a greater amount than their 
own.147 This is referred to as “cost predation.”148 For example, although man-
datory disclosure rules under the federal securities laws might increase the 
compliance costs of all public companies, these costs will fall disproportion-
ately on small, upstart firms with more prospects than revenues rather than 
large, established firms.149 Consequently, these large established firms might 
actually demand more, rather than less, regulation, which will make it harder 
for their rival upstarts to compete in the industry.150 Because regulation might 
actually benefit a certain cross section of the regulated industry, those benefi-
ciaries will find it in their interest to compensate regulators in exchange for 
regulation.151 This compensation will typically take the form of promises of 
future, post-government employment in a particular industry or other types of 
career support.152 
Regulators, however, are not limited to acting as simple brokers in this 
political economy, handing out rents in the form of regulation to certain well-
organized interest groups.153 Regulators can also extract rents for themselves 
through a form of political extortion.154 They do this by threatening to regulate 
where regulation would not benefit a certain group of firms.155 Alternatively, 
they engage in political extortion by threatening to deregulate where regulation 
benefits a certain group of firms.156 For example, just as large, well-established 
firms might compensate regulators for increased disclosure rules in an effort to 
increase their rivals’ costs, they might also be willing to compensate regulators 
for their agreement not to scale back the disclosure laws, which would result in 
the loss of their cost advantage over their competitors.157 
                                                                                                                           
 147 This is an example of Ricardian rent creation. MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 14. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 59, at 278; SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD 
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 46–51 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative 
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 909, 946–48 (1994); Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (2001) (arguing that the Securities Act of 1933 benefited certain stand-
alone investment banks at the expense of integrated banks). 
 150 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 59, at 277–78; Macey, supra note 149, at 914–15. 
 151 See Levine, supra note 15, at 273; Macey, supra note 149, at 914–15. 
 152 See Levine, supra note 15, at 273; supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 153 See Kysar, supra note 6, at 1051. 
 154 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 22–23; Halfteck, supra note 15, at 645–48; Kysar, supra 
note 6, at 1051. 
 155 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 26–27, 41; Halfteck, supra note 15, at 645–48. 
 156 See Halfteck, supra note 15, at 645–48; see MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 26–32, 41. 
 157 In reality, the bargain over regulation does not boil down to a stark, binary choice between 
regulation or no regulation, but rather is best characterized by a continuum between these two ex-
tremes. Thus, in a sense, every regulatory bargain will involve both rent creation through cost preda-
tion (where regulators create rents by adopting regulation that benefits certain interest groups) and rent 
extraction through political extortion (where regulators exercise forbearance in rent creation). 
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B. The Intuition: An Explanation for the Dearth of Experimental Rules 
Both of these public choice accounts—the “cost predation” account and 
the “political extortion” account158—play an important role in understanding 
why experimental rules might be disfavored in the political economy. Consider 
an interest group that has the organization to obtain a given policy in exchange 
for promises of future career support for regulators. This policy could be 
adopted in one of two forms: it could be adopted on a permanent basis; or it 
could be adopted on a short-term, experimental basis with the goal of recon-
sidering the desirability of adopting the policy on a permanent basis after the 
expiration of the sunset period. 
There are two reasons to believe that the supporters of this hypothetical 
policy might “pay” the regulator less for the policy if it is adopted as an exper-
imental rule rather than a non-experimental, permanent one. First, the experi-
mental rule is more likely to be temporary than the permanent rule because the 
policy’s readoption after expiration of the sunset is contingent on the results of 
the experiment.159 If the experiment generates data that suggests that the policy 
is not cost-effective, then the regulator will be less likely to readopt the policy 
after the sunset’s expiration; or if the rule is adopted, a court will be more like-
ly to vacate it because the conclusion that the rule is cost-effective in light of 
the evidence to the contrary would have difficulty surviving arbitrary and ca-
pricious review.160 Thus, if the policy will increase the costs of the interest 
group’s rivals (as under the cost predation account), it will do so for a shorter 
time under the experimental rule than under the permanent rule. 
The second reason that the supporters of this hypothetical policy might 
value experimental rules less is that an experimental rule is a more effective 
vehicle for political extortion than a permanent rule.161 Regulators can always 
threaten to repeal rules or regulations that benefit certain interest groups in an 
effort to extract payments from those groups in exchange for the regulators’ 
forbearance.162 This is true regardless of the type of rule at issue. But the 
amount of rents that a regulator can extract from this political extortion does 
depend on whether the rule is experimental (and therefore expires automatical-
ly on its own terms) or not.163 This is because the greater the costs that the 
agency must incur to repeal a given rule, the less credible the threat is, and 
therefore, the smaller the rents are that the agency can extract as a result of 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 14, 20. 
 159 See Gersen, supra note 4, at 285 (observing that “holding the substance of legislation constant, 
a temporary measure actually produces less benefit to an interest than does otherwise equivalent per-
manent legislation” because the temporary measure will be of shorter duration). 
 160 Recall that this is why arbitrary and capricious review has the potential of reinforcing learning, 
as discussed previously. See supra notes 10, 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 161 See Kysar, supra note 6, at 1051–52. 
 162 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 15, at 20–26; Halfteck, supra note 15, at 645–48. 
 163 See Kysar, supra note 6, at 1051–52. 
2014] Experimental Rules 157 
these threats. To repeal a permanent rule, a regulator would have to follow the 
costly procedures imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which, in the 
case of the repeal of formal rules, would require a formal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.164 These costs will clearly be greater than the costs of allowing an 
experimental rule to expire automatically on its own terms.165 
C. The Model: The Higher “Cost” of Experimental Rules 
This intuition that interest groups might be willing to pay less for experi-
mental rules than for permanent rules is captured in a more concrete manner in 
Figure 1 below. To understand this figure, imagine a hypothetical agency poli-
cy that can be structured in one of two ways. First, it could be structured as an 
experimental rule, meaning that it is adopted on a trial basis and sunsets after 
some relatively modest amount of time, say two years. After this “experimental 
period,” the agency can decide whether to extend the rule indefinitely or reject 
it in favor of another rule. Alternatively, that same policy could be structured 
as a permanent, single-stage rule with no automatic expiration. In each case, 
the rule is challenged in court shortly after its adoption on the ground that the 
agency’s decision to promulgate the rule was “arbitrary and capricious.” For 
simplicity of explication, assume that the statute of limitations for challenging 




Figure 1: Comparing the Expected Value of Multi-Stage and Single-Stage Rules 




E(V) = P(A1) x V1 + P(A1) x P(A2) x V2 – P(A1) x VE(1) – CE 




E(V) = P(A1) x V1 + P(A1) x V2 – P(A1) x VE(2) – CP 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., KOCH, supra note 71, § 4:22 (explaining that “the effort to repeal or modify [a] rule 
must be through a process having equal status with the original rule”); see also Nat’l Family Planning 
& Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that an agency can-
not alter, without notice-and-comment, a legislative rule, “unless such a change can be legitimately 
characterized as merely a permissible interpretation of the regulation, consistent with its language and 
original purpose”). 
 165 Kysar, supra note 6, at 1051–52 (“It is much easier to let a sunset expire than to repeal or 
amend legislation.”). 
 166 In reality, the statute of limitations for such actions is six years. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) 
(2006). 
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For interest groups that favor this policy, the expected value of these two 
alternative rules might be thought of as consisting of four different compo-
nents. The first component (Term 1) is the value of the policy during the first 
two years of its life, which in the hypothetical corresponds to the initial (pre-
sunset) stage of the experimental rule. The value of the policy (V1) for the du-
ration of this two-year period must be discounted by the probability that the 
rule will survive arbitrary and capricious review (P(A1)), which by hypothesis 
takes place shortly after the rule’s adoption. Term 1 in each equation is equal 
because the standard of review is the same regardless of whether the policy is 
structured as an experimental or a single-stage rule. 
The second component of the expected value equation (Term 2) consists 
of the value of the policy (V2) following this initial two-year period. This value 
must also be discounted, but the discount rate will differ depending on the type 
of rule in question. With respect to the permanent, single-stage rule, the value 
of the policy after the initial two-year period will be discounted by the proba-
bility that the court affirms the rule during the initial two-year period.167 After 
all, if the rule is not affirmed during the initial two-year period, then that is the 
end of the rule. 
The case of the multi-stage rule is a bit more complicated. In order for 
there to be a post-experimental period at all in that case (i.e., a period lasting 
longer than the initial two-year period), the agency must extend the rule on a 
permanent basis after it sunsets,168 and the extended rule must overcome yet 
another round of judicial review because the extension of the rule will be a 
separate agency action subject to judicial review. In other words, the principal 
difference between a single-stage rule and a multi-stage rule (that is readopted 
following the experimental period) is that the multi-stage rule will need to sur-
vive judicial review twice, once prior to the expiration of the experimental pe-
riod and a second time after the rule is readopted. Thus, V2 must be discounted 
by the probability that the extended rule will survive a second arbitrary and 
capricious review (P(A2)).169 Of course, as in the case of the single-stage rule, 
                                                                                                                           
 167 In the hypothetical, no legal challenges could be brought with respect to the single-stage rule 
after this initial two-year period since that is the length of the statute of limitations. See supra note 
166. In reality, this assumption probably does not matter since a rule will only be challenged once and 
this challenge will almost always occur within the first year or within the first couple of months of the 
rule’s adoption. 
 168 One might object that Equation (1) does not reflect the probability that the agency will extend 
the rule on a permanent basis. This might be a concern if the political dynamic were to change be-
tween the start and end of the experimental period so that it no longer favored the interest groups 
responsible for the rule’s adoption in the first place. But assuming that the political dynamic is rela-
tively stable (and the experimental period will typically not be long—in the hypothetical, it is only 
two years), the agency will adopt the rule on a permanent basis as long as those interest groups are 
willing to pay the extortion costs, which are reflected in Term 3. 
 169 This informal model assumes that the dominant interest group that favors the policy in ques-
tion can get the agency to readopt the policy on a permanent basis after the experimental rule expires 
simply by paying off the agency. Under this assumption, the only reason that a multi-stage experi-
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if the multi-stage rule is not affirmed during the experimental period (the initial 
two-year period in the case of the single-stage rule), then there will be no post-
experimental period. Thus, as in the case of the single-stage rule, V2 in equa-
tion (1) must also be discounted by P(A1). Thus, Term 2 in equation (1) will be 
less than Term 2 in equation (2), as evidenced in the chart by the less-than 
symbol. 
The third component of the expected value equation (Term 3) must cap-
ture the likelihood that the rule’s backers will have to pay extortion rents in the 
event that the agency decides to threaten to repeal the rule (in the case of the 
single-stage rule) or to allow it to expire without extension (in the case of the 
multi-stage rule). These extortion rents (VE) are going to be greater for the 
multi-stage rule (VE(1)) than for the single-stage rule (VE(2)) because, as previ-
ously discussed, it is more credible for an agency to threaten to allow the rule 
to expire automatically than it is for an agency to threaten to repeal the rule 
pursuant to the complicated procedures set forth in the APA.170 And of course, 
(VE) must also be discounted by the probability that the rule will survive arbi-
trary and capricious review in the first instance P(A1). Thus, Term 3 in equa-
tion (1) is going to be greater than Term 3 in equation (2), as evidenced in the 
chart by the greater-than symbol. 
In comparing the two equations in Figure 1, and ignoring the cost term 
(Term 4), which will be discussed momentarily, it should be clear now how the 
expected value of the multi-stage rule might be less than the expected value of 
the single-stage counterpart. This observation, however, only gets part of the 
way toward determining the total rents available under each type of rule. After 
all, just because the demand side might be willing to pay less for one product 
than it will pay for an alternative does not mean that the supply-side’s revenues 
will fall if it provides that product over the alternative. Think of this in terms 
of butter and margarine. For example, just because consumers are willing to 
pay less for margarine does not mean that firms will obtain less revenue if they 
produce margarine instead of butter. Whether they will depends on the differ-
ence in quantity demanded for the two goods. If the quantity demanded for the 
lesser priced margarine is sufficiently greater than the quantity demanded for 
                                                                                                                           
mental rule might be more temporary than a single-stage rule is because a court might vacate the mul-
ti-stage rule after it has been readopted on a permanent basis following the experiment. There is also 
the possibility, however, that the agency will simply refuse to readopt the policy on a permanent basis 
because it cannot justify the policy in light of the data generated by the experiment. This is another 
reason why the multi-stage rule might be more temporary than a single-stage rule. Nevertheless, it 
doesn’t affect the ultimate point being made here: a permanent rule that first passes through an exper-
imental period must survive two rounds of judicial review rather than the single round that a perma-
nent rule is subject to when adopted as a single-stage rule at the outset. And therefore, as explained in 
Part III, one attempt at subsidizing experimental rules might be to lessen the costs related to the judi-
cial review of experimental rules. 
 170 See supra notes 19, 161–165 and accompanying text. 
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butter to more than offset the difference in price, then a firm’s revenues will 
actually be greater if it produces the less expensive product. 
Similarly, the determination of total rents available under the two differ-
ent types of rules will depend not only on the price of regulation (reflected in 
Figure 1) but also on the demand for the different rules. For example, it is pos-
sible that experimental rules are like the cheaper, but more popular marga-
rine—the cheaper price brings in new interest groups that would not otherwise 
participate in the political economy, thereby increasing the value that agencies 
can extract from the production of these rents.171 This is unlikely, however, 
because interest groups are relatively entrenched at particular agencies.172 
Comparatively, in markets where the medium of exchange is cash, different 
consumer groups can easily enter and exit the market in response to changes in 
prices. Such is not the case in the market for regulation. In that market, the 
medium of exchange is not cash, but rather “career support.”173 At the agency 
level, this career support typically comes in the form of informal and formal 
promises of employment after the regulator leaves the agency.174 These types 
of promises require established relationships, which take time to build and nur-
ture. This entrenched nature of the consumer group in the market for regulation 
means that the demand for experimental rules (or more particularly, the num-
ber of consumers who are willing to pay for such rules) is more or less the 
same as the demand for single-stage rules. 
Consider then how these various elements of the political economy of ex-
perimental rules fit together. Interest groups in the market for regulation will 
typically pay more for single-stage rules than they will for multi-stage rules. 
Moreover, because the number of consumers willing to pay for regulation is 
more or less the same regardless of the rule in question, there will be higher 
rents associated with single-stage rules than with multi-stage rules.175 Thus, the 
political economy will tend to favor single-stage rules.176 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Professor Gersen raises this possibility with respect to temporary legislation. See Gersen, su-
pra note 4, at 285. 
 172 Cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2500–04 (2005) (arguing that 
there are fewer interests involved in the production of corporate law in Delaware than there are in 
Washington D.C., and there is little chance of interests migrating to Delaware that are not already 
there). This stability of the interests that manage to capture an agency is implicit in the observation 
that interest groups are more likely to capture a single agency than multiple ones. See HULT, supra 
note 20, at 8; O’Connell, supra note 20, at 1677; supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 173 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 174 See supra notes 16, 152 and accompanying text. 
 175 An increase in demand in response to a decrease in price occurs not just because new consum-
ers enter the market in response to the price decrease, but because the pre-existing consumers buy 
more of the cheaper product. Thus, one might argue that just because interest groups are fairly en-
trenched in a particular agency culture, and therefore the lower priced experimental rules are unlikely 
to attract new interest groups, total revenue may nevertheless stay the same or increase if current in-
terest groups purchase more experimental rules than they do permanent rules. Although this makes 
perfect sense when describing firms, it makes less sense when describing government entities that are 
subject to a fixed budget that is not a function of the amount of revenues generated by the political 
2014] Experimental Rules 161 
Of course, the analysis thus far has considered only the relative benefits 
of experimental and permanent rules; the price interest groups are willing to 
pay for regulatory rents (and the value regulators receive in exchange for such 
rents) is going to be a function not only of benefits but of costs as well. The 
transaction cost element (Term 4) of this political economy analysis, however, 
is considerably more indeterminate than the revenue element (Terms 1–3), an 
observation that is reflected in Figure 1 by the inclusion of both inequality and 
equality signs. 
The transaction costs associated with the adoption of a formal agency rule 
consist primarily of the costs that interest groups must incur to participate in 
the notice-and-comment period.177 For an interest group that desires the adop-
tion of a particular policy that will endure for the relative long term, an exper-
imental rule might on the one hand seem particularly attractive from a cost 
perspective. After all, the costs associated with the initial adoption of an exper-
imental rule (CE1) are likely to be less than the costs associated with the initial 
adoption of a permanent rule (CP), because there is relatively less at stake with 
a rule that will automatically terminate, and therefore, less of a need to invest 
effort in its adoption.178 
                                                                                                                           
economy. In other words, budget constraints limit the number of total rulemakings that agencies can 
undertake in a year. So the question is simply whether those rulemakings are going to be in the form 
of experimental rules or non-experimental rules. It matters little that interest groups might be willing 
to buy more experimental rules because of their cheaper price because the total number of rule-
makings possible given the agency’s budget is more or less fixed. Of course, there is always the pos-
sibility that an agency could adopt more experimental rules than permanent rules, notwithstanding the 
agency’s budget constraints, if experimental rules are less costly to promulgate than permanent ones. 
As discussed below, the comparative cost analysis of experimental and permanent rules is indetermi-
nate. But the dearth of experimental rules in practice suggests that experimental rules tend to be more 
costly than permanent rules in the long-run. And even if they are less costly, the cost savings are not 
sufficient to outweigh the lower “price” that interest groups are willing to pay for experimental rules. 
 176 Note that this conclusion is largely consistent with the public choice literature on the durability 
of laws. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878–79 (1975); Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy 
and Public Choice, 6 S. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 180 (1998); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and 
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 344 (1988). Recently, Professor Gersen has mounted an important 
challenge to this literature. See Gersen, supra note 4, at 280–81. Professor Gersen’s argument has both 
a theoretical and empirical component. Id. As a theoretical matter, Gersen argues that long-term legis-
lation, for example legislation lacking an automatic expiration, can be prematurely terminated by 
future lawmakers who decide to repeal the law. Id. Although this is certainly true, it is undoubtedly 
less costly from the standpoint of a lawmaker to terminate a law with a sunset provision by allowing it 
to terminate automatically than it is to formally repeal a law that does not contain a sunset provision. 
Professor Gersen’s empirical point is that the durability of legislation is heterogeneous. Id. at 280. 
Although this might be true with respect to federal statutes, as shown in Part I, it is not the case with 
respect to rules adopted by federal agencies, which are very rarely made to terminate automatically. 
 177 Professor Gersen divides these costs into both enactment costs and maintenance costs. Gersen, 
supra note 4, at 263. This Article focuses on enactment costs because, except for the difference in 
extortion costs, which are a type of maintenance cost, maintenance costs should be relatively equal for 
experimental and non-experimental rules alike. And the difference in extortion costs is already cap-
tured by Term 3. 
 178 See id. at 264; Kysar, supra note 6, at 1021. 
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On the other hand, in order for that same policy to endure for the long 
run, if it is structured as an experimental rule, the interest group in question 
would also need to incur costs (CE2) to persuade the agency to readopt the rule 
after it sunsets. Clearly, this cost is not present when the policy is structured as 
a permanent rule. Moreover, this cost of readoption after the sunset period 
(CE2) will likely be a function of the data generated during the experimental 
period. If the data favors the desired policy, then CE2 will be relatively less (be-
cause it will require less effort to persuade the agency to readopt) and vice ver-
sa. Thus, the costs of structuring the policy as an experimental rule will some-
times be greater than structuring that same policy as a permanent rule. Other 
times, the opposite will be true. 
The indeterminacy of this comparative cost analysis, however, has no ef-
fect on this Article’s ultimate conclusions. This Article has argued thus far that 
there are real social benefits that arise from experimental rules, but that as an 
empirical matter, they appear to be disfavored in the political economy.179 
They may be disfavored for a combination of revenue and cost factors. This 
Article has shown how the “revenues” generated from experimental rules are 
likely to be less than for permanent rules.180 Of course, if experimental rules 
were commonly adopted by agencies, then one would have to conclude that 
these smaller revenues are offset by the cost considerations. In reality, howev-
er, experimental rules are actually quite rare, which points to one of two con-
clusions about the cost structure of these rules: either experimental rules are 
simply more costly than permanent rules or, if they are not more costly, then 
the amount of costs saved through the use of experimental rules must be less 
than the amount of revenues lost through these rules’ use. Ultimately, however, 
drawing a definitive conclusion about the comparative costs of these two rule 
types is unnecessary to evaluate how the political economy can be harnessed in 
an attempt to nudge agencies toward greater experimentation. 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Some might argue that competition in the political economy will actually lead to socially op-
timal outcomes, and therefore, if legislators and regulators do not rely on experimental rules, then it 
must be because they are not socially optimal. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition 
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 394–96 (1983) (arguing that 
competition amongst pressure groups for political influence is reflected in government outcomes that 
correct market failures); Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, 
28 J. PUB. ECON. 329, 329–30 (1985) (arguing that pressure groups influence political outcomes as 
they “jockey for power”); see also DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: 
WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 2 (1995) (arguing that all democratic markets—
including political markets—are organized to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes, are highly com-
petitive, and reward efficient behavior); Tyler Cowen et al., Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision 
of Public Goods, 6 ECON. & POL. 131, 131–32 (1994) (arguing that rent-seeking can increase political 
effort, thereby increasing social welfare). The dominant theory, however, is that rent-seeking does not 
necessarily result in optimal social outcomes. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 94, at 34, 58. 
 180 See supra notes 20, 166–176 and accompanying text. 
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III. ENCOURAGING POLICY EXPERIMENTATION 
This Part proposes that applying a deferential standard of judicial review 
to experimental rules would increase the value of experimental rules in the po-
litical economy and thereby encourage agencies to increase their usage of such 
rules.181 Section A of this Part first proposes a deferential judicial review for 
experimental rules.182 Section A then proceeds to demonstrate how this defer-
ential judicial review would permit courts to consider only the procedural re-
quirements of hard look review in the pre-sunset phase.183 Section B then an-
ticipates and addresses three preliminary objections to this new deferential 
standard of judicial review for experimental rules. Section C uses Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, a 2011 U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decision, 
to illustrate how deferential judicial review would operate.184 Section D then 
discusses the benefits of applying a principle of deference.185 Finally, Section 
E briefly addresses potential costs to a principle of deference, but concludes 
that these potential costs are greatly outweighed by the benefits discussed in 
Section D.186 
A. A Proposal for More Deferential Judicial Review for  
Experimental Rules 
Part II’s public choice analysis suggests that the value of experimental 
rules in the political economy turns in part on two factors: the standard of re-
view applied to final agency rules and the fact that any long-term policy that 
goes through an experimentation process would have to survive two separate 
instances of judicial review.187 As such, alteration of the judicial standard of 
review could serve as a lever for nudging interests toward greater reliance on 
experimental rules. To that end, this Article proposes that courts apply a more 
deferential standard of review to experimental rules than they apply to their 
non-experimental counterparts. I call this the “principle of deference” to exper-
imental rules.188 The intended effect of this principle of deference is to make 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See infra notes 182–269 and accompanying text. 
 182 See infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 183 See infra notes 190–196 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra notes 197–246 and accompanying text. 
 185 See infra notes 247–269 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 247–269 and accompanying text. 
 187 See supra notes 141–180 and accompanying text. 
 188 Other scholars have argued that courts should be more deferential to experimental approaches 
to lawmaking as a matter of doctrine and theory. See, e.g., Abramowicz et al., supra note 4, at 981–82 
(contending that randomized experimentation in agency policy making should warrant more deferen-
tial judicial review, as courts should recognize the “unique value” in randomized experimentation); 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 267, 395–98 (1998) (arguing for deferential judicial review of experimental regulatory ap-
proaches that would focus on whether an agency undertook the effort to “generate rolling best-
practices standards”). This Article’s contribution is in developing the argument for, and the outlines 
164 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:129 
experimental rules relatively more valuable to interest groups than single-stage 
rules, thereby nudging rulemakers toward policy experimentation.189 
Although there are many different ways of operationalizing this principle 
of deference in order to encourage the increased use of experimental rules, this 
Article proposes a standard of review for experimental rules that incorporates 
only the procedural element of hard look review. Recall that under hard look 
review, courts are to ensure that agencies follow a prescribed procedure: they 
must take into account only those factors that the organic statute identifies as 
being relevant to the particular rulemaking in question.190 But hard look review 
also incorporates a substantive element.191 Courts review the agency’s explana-
tions and conclusions to ensure that they are reasonable.192 In other words, to 
survive hard look review, the agency “must articulate a ‘satisfactory’ explana-
tion for its actions that does not ‘run counter to the evidence before the agency’ 
and that demonstrates a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.’”193 
This Article’s proposed standard of review for experimental rules would 
require the procedural element of hard look review but would not incorporate 
the substantive element. Thus, for an experimental rule to survive judicial re-
view, the agency would have to show only that it took into account the relevant 
factors in promulgating the rule. A reviewing court would otherwise defer to 
the agency’s predictions or conclusions regarding the costs and benefits of the 
rule, as well as to the inferences the agency draws from any extant data that it 
considers. By incorporating the procedural but not the substantive element of 
hard look review, this proposed standard would result in greater deference to 
agencies with respect to experimental rules, thereby achieving the goal of 
nudging the political economy toward experimentation. Moreover, it would do 
so without completely eliminating the requirement that agencies engage in rea-
                                                                                                                           
of, a separate (highly deferential) standard of review for experimental rules with the express goal of 
nudging agencies in a political economy framework toward greater use of experimentation. 
 189 Note that this Article makes no assumption about the normative desirability of interest group 
legislation; it does not argue that agency rules are deficient because they are the product of interest 
group activity and therefore we need a policy response. Rather, this Article argues that agency rules in 
many cases are deficient because they are not structured as experimental rules, and in thinking about 
how to encourage the use of experimental rules, we need to understand, as a descriptive matter, how 
such rules are valued by interest groups in the political economy. In other words, this Article uses 
public choice not to generate normative force for a particular policy goal, but rather as a way of un-
derstanding the proper means to accomplish a particular policy goal (increased use of experimental 
rules) that derives its normative force from something other than public choice theory (in particular, 
the benefits of experimentation). Thus, critiques of attempts to use public choice theory alone to gen-
erate normative results are inapplicable to this Article’s argument. See Elhauge, supra note 94, at 58. 
 190 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 191 See supra notes 89, 91 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 193 Garland, supra note 90, at 545 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
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soned decision making, which would arguably be the result of a more deferen-
tial standard like rational basis review. 
To be sure, this Article is not the first to propose a more deferential stand-
ard of review with respect to agency rules.194 These prior proposals, however, 
were intended not to spur experimentation, but simply to avoid the “ossifica-
tion” of agency rules by what is perceived as a standard of judicial review that 
is too stringent.195 By contrast, the position taken in this Article is that tradi-
tional hard look review is necessary to reinforce the learning created by exper-
imentation,196 but only after the agency has had the opportunity to experiment. 
For that reason, traditional substantive hard look review should be relaxed dur-
ing the initial, experimental stage of an experimental rule (i.e., before the sun-
set), then rigorously applied after the experimental period has expired (i.e., 
after the sunset) when the agency must make a more permanent decision in 
light of the evidence generated by the experiment. 
B. Three Preliminary Objections 
Before considering how this principle of deference for experimental rules 
might apply in practice, first consider three preliminary objections, all of 
which are concerned with ways in which this bifurcated approach to judicial 
review of agency rules might lend itself to exploitation by the agency. 
The first objection is that an agency might choose to implement a policy 
through an experimental rule instead of a permanent one, not because the poli-
cy issue in question is particularly uncertain (and therefore could benefit from 
experimentation) but rather because the agency simply wants to reap the bene-
fits of a higher level of judicial deference. One way of addressing this issue 
would be to involve the courts in deciding the reasonableness of an agency’s 
decision to experiment with respect to a given policy. Such review of experi-
mental reasonableness would likely have to be carefully limited so that it did 
not defeat the purpose of the principle of deference, which after all is to create 
a more deferential standard of review for experimental rules in order to en-
courage their use. For example, the court might have to determine that there is 
reason to believe that the available evidence regarding a particular policy 
would likely be improved through experimentation. As long as the court de-
termined that this threshold standard of experimental reasonableness was met, 
the predictions and conclusions underlying the agency’s experimental rule 
would then merit application of the principle of deference. 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 25, at 1436; Pierce, supra note 25, at 8, 22. 
 195 McGarity, supra note 25, at 1436, 1451; Pierce, supra note 25, at 24–25; see also Abramowicz, 
et al., supra note 4, at 981–82 (suggesting that agency experiments should receive greater deference, not in 
order to foster greater experimentation but as a matter of policy and doctrine). 
 196 See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, this concern about agencies adopting experimental rules in or-
der to avoid heightened judicial scrutiny might not be much of a concern at all 
if the agency was required to adopt a permanent rule once the experiment had 
run its course and the agency was limited as to the permissible duration of an 
experimental rule. In that case, maybe the experiment would not have been 
necessary, but it might be a small price to pay for greater experimentation in 
general, including for policies that could truly benefit from the experiment. 
Such an observation raises the second way in which the principle of def-
erence might be exploited by agencies. Once a given experimental rule expires, 
an agency might readopt precisely the same rule (or a slightly modified version 
of that rule)—once again on an experimental basis, and possibly successively 
thereafter. In doing so, the agency would avoid ever having to submit to the 
higher level of scrutiny—hard look review—that applies to permanent rules. 
This problem, however, hardly seems intractable, particularly if limits on ex-
perimentation were put in place. For example, we might impose a rule on 
agencies requiring that an experiment be substantially different from a prior 
experiment and subject that determination to judicial review. 
The third way that agencies might exploit the differential treatment that 
experimental rules would receive under this proposed principle of deference 
would be by adopting experimental periods for their rules that are unnecessari-
ly long in light of the requirements of the experiment. By doing so, an agency 
would reap the benefits of deference for a longer period than is necessary to 
generate sufficient experimental data. Although a legitimate concern, this is 
also manageable through a cap on the length of the sunset period. For example, 
it might be established that the sunset period cannot last for more than three 
years. If the agency desired a longer sunset period, it would need to justify that 
extended period to a court at the expiration of the three years. 
C. Applying the Principle of Deference: Business Roundtable v. SEC 
To see how this proposed principle of deference would work in practice, 
consider a recent high-profile case involving an SEC rule. In 2011, in Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC’s proxy access rule.197 
The proxy access rule was intended to give shareholders of public companies 
greater power to nominate members of the company’s board of directors.198 
The modern proxy access rule199 was at least eight years in the making.200 
                                                                                                                           
 197 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 198 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294). 
 199 Proxy access had been considered before, both in 1942 and then again in 1977. See Security and 
Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 17–19 (1943) (statement of Ganson Purcell, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (testifying that the SEC solicited comments on staff 
proposal); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORPORATE FIN., STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY 
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When it was finally adopted, the rule was immediately challenged in the courts 
by the Business Roundtable, an interest group representing large companies.201 
The D.C. Circuit vacated the proxy access rule in part because of problems 
with the SEC’s predictions and conclusions regarding the costs and benefits of 
the rule, which of course were highly uncertain given the nature of the rule.202 
In particular, the court reasoned that the SEC “neglected to support its predic-
tive judgments” and “failed adequately to quantify the [sic] certain costs or to 
explain why those costs could not be quantified.”203 Specifically, the SEC con-
cluded that the proxy access rule would increase shareholder value,204 that the 
costs of the rule would be limited,205 that the rule would not be co-opted by 
special interests,206 and that the rule would generate proxy challenges that 
would not otherwise have taken place in the rule’s absence.207 The court found 
fault with each one of these predictions and conclusions on the basis that they 
                                                                                                                           
PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 2–3 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8S2S-FLXA (recapping 
the history of proxy access proposals); Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 
3347, Holding Company Act Release No. 3988, Investment Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 WL 
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including the suggestion related to shareholder access to the company’s proxy material). 
 200 For a useful overview of the history of the proxy access rule, see Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive 
Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 440–47 (2012). The rule was first formally 
proposed in 2003. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784–86 (Oct. 23, 
2003) (codified in 17 C.F.R. at pts. 240, 249, 274). But then-SEC Chairman, William Donaldson, a 
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to clarify its rules with respect to whether a company could 
omit a shareholder proposal recommending the adoption of a bylaw permitting proxy access at that 
particular company. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 
123–24 (2d Cir. 2006). In response to the AFSCME decision, the SEC proposed a policy that would 
allow the SEC to exclude a shareholder proposal to implement proxy access at an individual company 
through amendment of the company’s bylaws. Fisch, supra, at 444–45. It also re-proposed the proxy 
access rule that had originally been proposed in 2003. Id. at 445. The SEC eventually adopted the first 
proposal and failed to adopt the second. Id. With the election of President Barack Obama, however, 
and the appointment of Mary Schapiro as SEC Commissioner, proxy access again came on the policy 
radar. Id. This time the rule was adopted, with support of the three Democratic commissioners and 
over the objection of the two Republicans, on August 25, 2010. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 
1147; Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668, 56,793; Fisch, supra, at 
447. 
 201 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146, 1148; Romano, supra note 104, at 1564. 
 202 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49. 
 203 Id. at 1149. 
 204 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,761; see Bus. Roundtable, 
647 F.3d, at 1150–51. 
 205 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,770; see Bus. Roundtable, 
647 F.3d at 1150. 
 206 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,766; see Bus. Roundtable, 
647 F.3d at 1152. 
 207 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,772; see Bus. Roundtable, 
647 F.3d at 1153. 
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were not supported by sufficient evidence.208 To be sure, the court was almost 
certainly correct about the lack of evidence, but the problem is that there was 
not overwhelming evidence that cut in the other direction (i.e., against the 
SEC’s conclusions) either. 
Consider, for example, the evidence regarding the effect of the proxy ac-
cess rule on shareholder value.209 This evidence mainly consisted of four 
groups of studies.210 First, there were five studies that examined the sharehold-
er wealth effects of traditional proxy contests—that is to say, situations where 
shareholders pay to publish and distribute their own proxy containing a list of 
their own nominees to the board of directors.211 Second, there was one study 
that looked at corporate governance at thirty-seven firms during the financial 
crisis.212 Third, there were two studies that looked at the effect on firm value of 
shareholder-nominated members (or otherwise independent members) of the 
board of directors.213 Finally, there were two studies that sought to measure the 
effect of the announcement of the SEC’s proxy access rule on the share price 
of a sample of firms.214 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149–54. 
 209 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,761–62; infra notes 
210–229 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 211–226 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,760 nn.911–12, 56,762 
nn.924, 926 (citing Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 4 (George M. Constantinides et al. ed., 2003); Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. 
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Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Govern-
ance and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15180, 2009), available at 
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Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012) (updated and 
published version of Andrea Beltratti and Rene M. Stulz’s article). 
 212 See id. at 56,760 n.912, 56,762 n.924 (citing Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” 
During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown?, The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009)). 
 213 See id. at 56,760 n.911, 56,762 nn.921, 923 (citing James F. Cotter et al., Do Independent 
Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1997); 
Chris Cernich et al., Effectiveness of Hybrid Boards, IRRC INSTITUTE (2009), http://www.irrc
institute.org/pdf/IRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XZD8-Z48J). 
 214 See id. at 56,762 n.924 (citing Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth 
Effects of the SEC’s Rule to Facilitate Director Nominations (Working Paper, 2009); David F. Larck-
er et al., Submitted Commentary on Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations 2 (Jan. 16, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-598.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WE5P-M7TE). 
See generally Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Rule to 
Facilitate Director Nominations, 47 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 1029 (2012) (updated and 
published version of Ali C. Akyol et al. working paper); David F. Larcker et al., The Market Reaction 
to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (2011) (updated and published version of 
David F. Larcker et al. paper submitted with SEC comment). 
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The first group of evidence contained studies that had examined the 
shareholder wealth effects of traditional proxy contests.215 With respect to this 
first group, the SEC discounted three of the studies—in one case because of its 
small sample size of only thirty-two firms,216 in another case because of the 
authors’ own acknowledgment that the results were ambiguous,217 and in the 
third case because a subsequent study demonstrated a flaw in the data collec-
tion of the prior study that, when corrected, reversed that study’s results.218 The 
two remaining studies in the group, which the SEC relied on, consisted of one 
study that demonstrated positive shareholder wealth effects from proxy con-
tests and another that was a survey piece that concluded that the “[t]he latest 
evidence suggests that proxy fights provide a degree of managerial disciplining 
and enhance shareholder value.”219 
The second group of evidence consisted of a single study of the quality of 
the corporate governance at thirty-seven firms during the financial crisis.220 
The author concluded that because these firms involved extremely active 
boards that replaced their CEOs at a greater than average rate, corporate gov-
ernance functioned tolerably well in these companies during the financial cri-
sis, and therefore, there was no immediate need for reform.221 The SEC dis-
counted this study in light of its small sample size and short timeframe, which 
was limited only to 2008.222 
The third group of evidence consisted of mainly two studies demonstrat-
ing that public companies with boards consisting of a minority of shareholder 
nominated (or otherwise independent) directors tended to have greater equity 
value than their peers.223 The SEC relied on these studies.224 
Finally, the last group of evidence consisted of two event studies that 
sought to measure the stock price reactions of public firms to the SEC’s an-
nouncement that it was considering a proxy access rule.225 The SEC discounted 
these studies on the ground that, as is common in criticisms of such event stud-
                                                                                                                           
 215 See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,762 n.926 (citing Bor-
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ies, their results were particularly sensitive to the particular dates selected by 
the researchers.226 
A review of this evidence suggests that it was anything but conclusive as 
to whether the proxy access rule would lead to an increase in shareholder val-
ue.227 In fact, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the evidence was “admittedly 
(at best) mixed.”228 Consistent with substantive hard look review, the D.C. Cir-
cuit weighed in on the reasonableness of the agency’s findings in light of the 
mixed evidence and ultimately disagreed with the SEC’s conclusions.229 
Consider now, by contrast, how differently this analysis would have 
played out under the principle of deference proposed by this Article. Assume 
the SEC had instead structured the proxy access rule as an experimental rule, 
in which case it would automatically expire after a few years with the goal of 
generating data during that initial experimental period to bring to bear on the 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See id. at 57,763 & n.928 (citing Akyol et al., supra note 214; Larcker et al., supra note 214). 
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 228 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
 229 See id. (“[W]e think the Commission has not sufficiently supported its conclusion that increas-
ing the potential for election of directors nominated by shareholders will result in improved board and 
company performance and shareholder value.”). In one sense, therefore, this Article agrees with Pro-
fessor James Cox who, in a recent article criticized the Business Roundtable court’s willingness to 
engage in substantive review of the SEC’s policy conclusions. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 4, at 
1813, 1824. After all, part of this Article’s argument in favor of the principle of deference is that sub-
stantive review of agency conclusions is inappropriate, particularly in highly uncertain policy areas 
like that of proxy access. The heart of Professor Cox’s critique, however, is that the D.C. Circuit mis-
interpreted the federal securities laws, which, as he quite rightly points out, require only that the SEC 
consider certain factors (including, in addition to investor protection, efficiency, competition and 
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further such goals. See id. at 1837. But as this Article tries (hopefully with some success) to make 
clear here, the problem is unfortunately much more fundamental than that and derives not from a 
misinterpretation of a single statute but rather from the D.C. Circuit’s general approach to judicial 
review of agency actions under the APA. In other words, substantive hard look review is likely to be 
inappropriate whenever policy uncertainty is high, which will often include securities regulation, but 
is certainly not limited to that context. See supra notes 190–193 and accompanying text. And substan-
tive hard look review will apply regardless of the precise wording of the organic statute regarding 
relevant factors for the rulemaking. See supra notes 190–193 and accompanying text. 
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decision whether to adopt the rule on a more permanent basis. Consistent with 
this Article’s proposal, the initial adoption of that experimental rule would be 
subject to judicial deference.230 Thus, the court would ask whether the SEC 
considered relevant factors in drawing its conclusions regarding proxy access, 
but would refrain from determining for itself the reasonableness of that conclu-
sion. By doing this, the court would be applying only the procedural compo-
nent of hard look review at the experimental rule phase.231 In this case, appli-
cation of that principle would clearly result in deference to the SEC’s predic-
tion that the proxy access rule would increase shareholder value. 
A similar conclusion would follow from application of the principle of 
deference to the SEC’s other conclusions with respect to the proxy access rule. 
Consider, for example, the SEC’s conclusion that the costs of the proxy access 
rule would be limited.232 This question turned at least in part on the extent to 
which the issuers would oppose proxy challenges brought pursuant to the 
proxy access rule.233 The only evidence presented on this issue was from the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which provided examples of the costs of recent 
proxy contests at large companies.234 In response, the SEC concluded that in at 
least some cases, directors’ fiduciary duties would limit costly opposition cam-
paigns if the directors determined that these campaigns are not cost-
effective.235 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the SEC’s prediction was 
based on insufficient evidence.236 
The SEC’s conclusion regarding whether the rule would be co-opted by 
special interests was similarly devoid of evidentiary support.237 Of course, nei-
ther was there evidentiary support for the alternative proposition. Nevertheless, 
the court thought there was still “good reason to believe” that the rule would 
be abused by special interests.238 Without the chance to test the rule, however, 
it was impossible to determine who was right. 
                                                                                                                           
 230 Note that before applying the principle of deference, the court might first be required to de-
termine whether it was reasonable for the SEC to engage in experimentation with respect to proxy 
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 231 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
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Finally, there was little evidence to shed light on the SEC’s core theory 
behind the proxy access rule, which was that it would lower the costs of wag-
ing a proxy battle because shareholders could simply include their nominees in 
the company’s proxy materials instead of having to go to the expense of pub-
lishing and mailing their own.239 These lower costs would therefore induce 
proxy contests that would not otherwise have been waged.240 The court, how-
ever, saw no evidence that the rule would not simply provide a way for those 
who would otherwise have brought a traditional proxy contest anyway to bring 
it with lower costs.241 In other words, the court faulted the SEC for not taking 
into account the possibility that the rule would not actually create any new 
proxy challenges. Yet, without testing the rule, there was really no way to pre-
dict such an outcome. 
Under the principle of deference proposed by this Article, as long as an 
agency makes a prediction about the costs and benefits of a rule—as the SEC 
did in Business Roundtable—the agency is shielded from the court’s more 
searching substantive review. By eliminating substantive review during the 
experimental phase, this proposal removes the risk that the court will make an 
error in determining whether the agency’s policy conclusions were reasonable. 
Under this Article’s proposed rule, therefore, none of the D.C. Circuit’s objec-
tions regarding the uncertainty of the proxy access rule would have been valid, 
provided of course that the SEC had adopted the proxy access as an experi-
mental rule.242 
To be sure, if applied to Business Roundtable, this proposed principle of 
deference may not have led to a different outcome in the case. The court iden-
tified additional defects that were not tied to the uncertainty of the proxy 
rule.243 For example, the court pointed out that the SEC had been inconsistent 
in its calculations of the costs and benefits of the rule.244 Moreover, the court 
reasoned that the SEC had been internally inconsistent in its estimations of the 
frequency of nominations.245 Nevertheless, the point is that under the defer-
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,753. 
 240 See id. at 56,772. 
 241 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153. 
 242 A separate question, which will have to be reserved for another day, is whether the court could 
save an otherwise faulty rule by interpreting it as an experimental rule that could survive until some 
sunset date. 
 243 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151, 1153–54. 
 244 See id. at 1151. The court determined that the Commission had been opportunistic in the way 
it framed the costs and benefits of the rule, including that the Commission had discounted the costs 
(but not the benefits) of the rule as an artifact of the right to elect directors under state law. See id. 
 245 See id. at 1153–54. It is true that the court identified yet another ground—that the Commission 
had failed to consider how pension funds would use the rule, including responding to comments that 
they would use the rule to the detriment of shareholders generally. See id. at 1151–52. The court, 
however, ultimately acknowledged that the Commission had indeed considered this factor, and there-
fore it seems that in the final analysis, the court was really saying that it just disagreed with the Com-
mission’s conclusion on this issue. See id. Thus, this ground for vacating the rule would be yet another 
substantive consideration that would be off limits under this Article’s proposed principle of deference. 
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ence principles outlined here, the court would have had to vacate the proxy 
access rule on these other grounds alone, and could not have relied on the other 
deficiencies that seemed to be a function of the uncertainty of the proxy access 
rule.246 
D. The Benefits of the Principle of Deference 
Although this Article’s proposed principle of deference would represent a 
significant departure from the current approach to judicial review of agency 
action, it would not be unprecedented; nor would it undermine the original 
purposes of hard look review.247 
First, the principle of deference would not be unprecedented. It was not 
that long ago that arbitrary and capricious review was typically treated as the 
same thing as “rational basis review, and was therefore even more deferential 
than the procedural hard look review for experimental rules proposed by this 
Article.248 In fact, it was only in the 1970s when the D.C. Circuit began sug-
gesting that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard required the court to ensure 
that the agency engaged in “reasoned decision-making,” which engendered a 
debate over whether this requirement demanded a review of the procedures 
followed by the agency or also of the substance of the agency’s decision.249 
This debate was largely put to rest, at least as a descriptive matter, with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.250 Of course, the principle of 
deference would be unprecedented in that neither the courts nor the APA dis-
tinguishes between experimental and non-experimental rules with respect to 
standards of review.251 The text of the APA, however, also fails to support a 
more searching form of arbitrary and capricious review for purposes of polic-
ing interest group legislation, and yet the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court 
have taken precisely this position with respect to review of final agency ac-
tion.252 For that reason, it does not appear to be that much of a stretch for the 
D.C. Circuit to reason that the justification underlying hard look review simply 
does not apply to experimental rules, at least with respect to the period prior to 
the sunset. 
                                                                                                                           
 246 Even though the court relied on other arguments as well for vacating the rule, it would proba-
bly be less likely to vacate the rule armed with fewer grounds for finding it deficient. 
 247 See infra notes 248–256 and accompanying text. 
 248 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 700 (6th ed. 2013) (describing this pre-
hard look review as affording agencies an “extraordinary level of deference”). 
 249 The origins of this debate are typically traced to the concurring opinions of Chief Judge David 
Bazelon and Judge Harold Leventhal in the 1976 D.C. Circuit case of Ethyl Corp. v. EPA. See 541 
F.2d 1, 66–68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); id. at 68–69 (Leventhal, J., concurring). 
 250 See 463 U.S. 29 (1983); supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 251 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 252 See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
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Nor would this Article’s proposed principle of deference undermine the 
original purposes of hard look review. Hard look review was developed by the 
D.C. Circuit, and later ratified by the Supreme Court, as a judicial remedy for 
what was perceived at the time as the emerging problem of agency capture.253 
If agencies were required to demonstrate that they “had responded to signifi-
cant points made during the public comment period, had examined all relevant 
factors, and had considered significant alternatives to the course of action ul-
timately chosen,”254 the reasoning went, then it would be more difficult for 
agencies to be captured by interest groups.255 This reasoning is perfectly plau-
sible, perhaps even wise, except with respect to rules with extremely uncertain 
payoffs. In the case of extreme uncertainty, when the evidence points in differ-
ent directions, there will be greater disagreement with respect to whether the 
agency satisfied substantive hard look review, and therefore, a greater likeli-
hood of a court making one of two types of errors: either affirming a sub-
optimal rule or vacating an optimal one.256 
The principle of deference might be viewed as a way of mediating be-
tween those who criticize substantive hard look review on the basis of the re-
viewing court’s lack of expertise257 and the supporters of substantive hard look 
review who highlight its potential for encouraging agencies to engage in a 
more comprehensive or deliberative decision-making process.258 On the one 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 
119 YALE L.J. 2, 15–23 (2009) (recounting the history of hard look review); see State Farm, 463 U.S. 
at 42–44; supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 254 See Garland, supra note 90, at 526–27. 
 255 See Watts, supra note 253, at 32–35. 
 256 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 89, at 492 (“From the agency’s perspective, hard look review 
has become an icy stare that freezes action; no matter how much care the agency believes it has given 
to a decision, the agency faces uncertainty about whether the reviewing court will find that the agency 
performed its decisionmaking task adequately.”). 
 257 See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 
78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1054–55 (2000) (arguing that “quality rulemaking is undermined” by the judi-
ciary’s lack of expertise); McGarity, supra note 25, at 1452 (observing that there are “clear limits to 
judicial competence in the area of highly scientific and technical rulemaking”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 69–70 (1995) (identifying how 
the judiciary’s lack of expertise can frustrate agency action); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discre-
tion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1507 (1983) (“Courts cannot take a hard look at materials 
they cannot understand nor be partners to technocrats in a realm in which only technocrats speak the 
language.”). 
 258 See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 
409–21 (1981); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regula-
tory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 811, 818–20; Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 
1570 (1992); Seidenfeld, supra note 89, at 514 (“In short, hard look review performs a valuable func-
tion by encouraging agencies to think through the full implications of their policies.”); Cass R. Sun-
stein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 
527–29 (“It is also possible to show that aggressive judicial review has often provided significant 
benefits both in bringing about desirable regulatory initiatives and in preventing unreasonable or un-
lawful regulation.”). 
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hand, the principle of deference acknowledges the potential of substantive hard 
look review to result in judicial error (either because courts affirm sub-optimal 
policies or vacate optimal ones). Consequently, it relaxes this standard when 
the payoffs of the rule are particularly uncertain, and therefore the likelihood 
of judicial error is particularly high.259 On the other hand, however, the princi-
ple of deference also recognizes substantive hard look review’s potential for 
improving agency decision making through learning.260 Accordingly, the prin-
ciple of deference would result in the application of rigorous substantive hard 
look review, but only after the agency has eliminated uncertainty through the 
experiment. 
To illustrate, consider yet again the issue of proxy access and the Business 
Roundtable case.261 In Business Roundtable, there was very little evidence re-
garding the central policy goals of the proxy access rule. What little evidence 
did exist, the court itself acknowledged was ambiguous.262 This rule was seem-
ingly a prime candidate for experimentation.263 Yet, because of the political 
economy’s preference for single-stage rules, the proxy access rule was not 
adopted as an experimental rule, and the SEC consequently lost out on the op-
portunity for learning. To be sure, the court ultimately vacated the rule; but it 
just as easily could have affirmed it. This is the problem with hard look review 
of rules that implement policies with extremely uncertain payoffs—there will 
be considerable disagreement, even among courts, regarding the correct out-
come of the case. Moreover, if the court in Business Roundtable had affirmed 
the rule, and the rule had ended up being sub-optimal for all of the reasons of-
fered by the rule’s opponents,264 then the court would have been entrenching a 
sub-optimal policy in a permanent rule. This is what one might call the first-
                                                                                                                           
 259 Pierce, supra note 257, at 68–70. Pierce stated: 
When an agency attempts to make major policy decisions through rulemaking in an ar-
ea affected by factual and scientific uncertainty . . . . It cannot hope to predict the pre-
cise scope or intensity of that review process. . . . [P]redicting the outcome of the re-
view proceeding is best accomplished by flipping a coin. . . . [Reviewing courts] are 
easily led to believe that . . . an inherent uncertainty with respect to a factual or scien-
tific predicate for a rule could be eliminated if the agency just thought about it a little 
more. 
Id. 
 260 See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text. 
 261 647 F.3d 1144. 
 262 See id. at 1151 (characterizing the empirical evidence as “(at best) mixed”). 
 263 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and 
the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 362, 392 (2010) (explaining how uncertainty regarding proxy access 
underlies his agnosticism on the policy); see also Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,687 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 294) (rejecting 
proposals to structure the proxy access rule as an experimental rule); Bigger Mess, supra note 63 
(quoting Wharton accounting professor Wayne R. Guay as advocating a sunset provision); Ribstein, 
supra note 63. 
 264 See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
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order problem of experimental rules: the political economy’s favored treatment 
of permanent rules (combined with the increased probability of judicial error in 
conducting hard look review) increases the likelihood that sub-optimal rules 
will become entrenched. 
Business Roundtable, however, also suggests that even if the relevant par-
ties had overcome the political economy dynamics and formulated the proxy 
access rule as an experimental rule, the SEC still would have lost out on the 
opportunity for learning because the court vacated the rule. This is what one 
might call the second-order problem of experimental rules: regardless of 
whether experimental rules are used, the increased probability of judicial error 
in conducting hard look review under conditions of extreme uncertainty result 
in vacating those rules before any data can be gathered to test their underlying 
theories.265 
The principle of deference addresses both of these problems.266 It solves 
the first-order problem because it encourages experimental policy making by 
making experimental rules relatively more valuable in the political economy.267 
Recall that, everything else being equal, interest groups will value single-stage 
rules more than they will multi-stage rules for two reasons.268 First, a multi-
stage rule is more likely to be temporary because a permanent rule that must 
                                                                                                                           
 265 McGarity, supra note 25, at 1452–53 (“[S]tringent substantive judicial review can hamper 
innovation and experimentation. Agencies will be disinclined to experiment when they know that the 
effort may wind up being thrown back at them by unsympathetic judges.”). 
 266 Several scholars have recently observed that dividing regulation up in stages might make for 
better policies, particularly in cases where uncertainty is high, like financial regulation and SEC rule-
making. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 4, at 1842–44; Romano, supra note 87, at 88, 95–107; 
Whitehead, supra note 4, at 1274, 1295. Although this Article obviously agrees with this observation 
as a general matter, what this Article argues for is something more specific—that without changing 
the way courts review final agency actions, such staged rules (or what this Article refers to as experi-
mental rules) are neither politically feasible nor maximally beneficial. They are not politically feasible 
because they are disfavored in the political economy for the reasons developed in Part II. See supra 
notes 141–180 and accompanying text. And they are not maximally beneficial because substantive 
hard look review, if applied equally to experimental rules as to their non-experimental counterparts, is 
likely to short circuit experimentation. After all, as discussed in greater detail below, if the proxy 
access rule in Business Roundtable had been structured as an experimental rule, the result (vacating of 
the rule) would likely have been the same, and the experiment would have been prematurely terminat-
ed because of substantive hard look review. Thus, any attempt to encourage the use of experimental 
rules must confront these two issues, which is the purpose behind this Article’s proposed principle of 
deference. 
 267 By contrast, one commentator has proposed that the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis be exempt from 
judicial review altogether. Bruce R. Kraus, Challenge to SEC Rule-Making, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/20111212/PRINTSUB/312129993, archived at http://
perma.cc/M6MF-CX84. But the problem with that approach is that it fails to address the concern over the 
entrenchment of sub-optimal rules. Even if executive agencies enjoy this type of exemption from judicial 
review, the fact that their analyses must pass muster with the Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs (OIRA) mitigates this concern. And because the SEC does not have to undergo OIRA review, ex-
empting SEC cost-benefit analyses from judicial review would leave their analyses completely un-
checked. 
 268 See supra notes 158–165, 175–176 and accompanying text. 
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first pass through an experimental period must undergo two rounds of judicial 
review instead of a single round when the permanent rule is adopted at the out-
set. Second, multi-stage rules have a greater potential for rent extortion and 
therefore must be discounted by a greater amount than single-stage rules. 
These inequalities are reflected in Term 2 and Term 3, respectively, of both 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Where the principle of deference makes a difference is in Term 1. Recall 
that this term of the expected value equation captures the value of the policy 
during the “experimental period,” which is the period that begins with adop-
tion and ends when the sunset expires (in the case of the multi-stage rule) and 
when the sunset would have expired (in the case of the single-stage rule) if the 
single-stage rule had been instead structured as an experimental rule. This val-
ue is discounted by the probability that a court will not vacate the rule under 
arbitrary and capricious review. As reflected in Figure 1, Term 1 is the same 
regardless of whether the policy is structured as an experimental rule or a mul-
ti-stage rule. After all, under current law, judicial review of whether a rule is 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA is the same regardless of whether it is 
an experimental rule or a permanent rule. The principle of deference changes 
this equality. As reflected in Figure 2, under the principle of deference, the val-
ue of the rule during the experimental period (Term 1) is greater for the exper-
imental rule than it is for the single-stage rule. This is because the principle of 
deference makes it more likely that an experimental rule will survive judicial 
review. By making experimental rules relatively more valuable on an expected 
value basis, the principle of deference increases the amount of rents that inter-
est groups may obtain (and value that agencies may receive in exchange) in the 
political economy and therefore nudges the parties toward experimental rules. 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparing the Expected Value of Multi-Stage and Single-Stage Rules Under the Prin-
ciple of Deference 




E(V) = P(A1) x V1 + P(A1) x P(A2) x V2 – P(A1) x VE(1) – CE 




E(V) = P(A1) x V1 + P(A1) x V2 – P(A1) x VE(2) – CP 
 
 
Again, the principle of deference solves both of the problems associated 
with experimental rules. The principle of deference addresses the first-order 
problem of experimental rules—that the bias in favor of single-stage rules, 
combined with the increased probability of judicial error in conducting hard 
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look review under conditions of extreme uncertainty, will lead to sub-optimal 
policies becoming entrenched. The principle of deference also solves the sec-
ond-order problem, which is that the court will mistakenly vacate an experi-
mental rule before its sunset, thereby short-circuiting the experiment. 
There is a certain irony in the Business Roundtable court’s objections 
over the quality or quantity of the evidence on which the SEC premised its 
predictions and conclusions regarding the proxy access rule. After all, by find-
ing that the decision-making process was inadequate for these reasons, the 
court effectively locked into place the inadequate store of data and prevented 
the SEC from running an experiment that would help it determine whether the 
rule was in fact a game changer or not. Thus, an additional benefit of the prin-
ciple of deference is that it would unlock a yet unexplored vein of potential 
value associated with experimental rules by allowing for greater experimenta-
tion. Had the SEC structured the proxy access rule as a multi-stage rule (and 
had the court applied the principle of deference in the way this Article sug-
gests), it is likely that the rule would have been upheld—at least until the sun-
set expired.269 At that point in time, several years of data would help determine 
whether the rule was the panacea advocated for by its supporters or the perni-
cious source of inefficiencies, as characterized by its opponents. In the absence 
of the principle of deference, however, the only result is speculation about 
whether the SEC’s predictions were correct. 
E. The Cost of the Principle of Deference 
The most significant cost associated with increased deference toward ex-
perimental rules is that this proposal will necessarily increase the rents availa-
ble to interest groups and rent-seeking costs spent to obtain such rents. Of 
course, such a result represents a deadweight loss for the economy. And in-
deed, it would do precisely that. In fact, the whole purpose of increased defer-
ence toward experimental rules is to increase the value of experimental rules to 
interest groups, which has the effect of also increasing the costs that such 
groups are willing to incur in order to obtain those regulatory rents. The result 
is a nudge in favor of experimentation, but also a nudge in favor of rent-
seeking, which represents a real deadweight loss. This cost becomes all the 
more acute when one considers that there is no guarantee that the principle of 
deference will actually result in the greater use of experimental rules, in which 
case rent-seeking costs would increase without an accompanying increase in 
associated benefits. 
                                                                                                                           
 269 As this Article previously suggested, this outcome is not guaranteed because there were addi-
tional grounds upon which the court justified its decision to vacate the rule, and those additional defi-
ciencies would not be remedied by the principle of deference. Nevertheless, it is possible, if not likely, 
that the court would have at the very least refused to vacate the rule altogether based merely on a few 
deficiencies in the SEC’s procedure. 
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Although these objections are certainly valid, they are ultimately unpersua-
sive to the extent that they are intended to defeat the principle of deference. The 
principle of deference may not actually result in greater use of experimental rules, 
but there is a good chance that it would, and the potential benefits are significant. 
Generalizing from the SEC example, recall that agencies are in many cases adopt-
ing highly uncertain policies in the form of single-stage rules, which is actually 
inferior from a welfare perspective to not only experimentation but to the status 
quo as well. Thus, perhaps we need to take a page from the literature on experi-
mentation itself and actually treat the principle of deference as an experiment. If it 
is unsuccessful, then it is certainly reversible. On the other hand, if it is successful, 
improved agency policy will result. Either way, the experiment will have been 
well worth it. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a growing recognition that experimentation, or staged decision 
making, holds out the potential for dramatically improving the quality of legis-
lative output. Rules that are adopted for the express purpose of generating ex-
perimental data and that automatically terminate at the conclusion of the policy 
experiment—what this Article calls “experimental rules” —are the obvious 
legal vehicle for carrying out this aspiration of legislative experimentalism. 
Yet, in the one context where experimental rules are likely to be the most ef-
fective—the federal agency context—these rules are, for the most part, ex-
traordinarily rare. This Article argues that both the source of this problem and 
the potential solution lie in public choice theory. The political economy ap-
pears to disfavor experimental rules either because they are more temporary 
and therefore less valuable to interest groups, or because they are more costly 
to adopt. This public choice equation could change, however, if courts were to 
apply greater deference to experimental rules than they do to non-experimental 
rules. By effectively guaranteeing that an experimental rule would survive ju-
dicial review—at least prior to the sunset period when the experiment is run-
ning its course—interest groups could be nudged toward this type of rule, 
thereby encouraging agencies to engage in greater experimentation. The effect 
would be laws with more predictability and therefore a greater likelihood of 
success. And of course, there is always the possibility, however remote, that 
experimental rules could produce the legislative equivalent of the light bulb.
  
 
 
